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I F TRODUCT I OI'J 
If a thoughtful Gre e1c were askecl to e nwnerate 
f a ctors wh ich have shaped his country's course throughout 
history, Gr eece's geogr aphica l po s i t io n u nquestiona bly 
would be give n utmos t cons i derat ion. Greece' s str at egic 
pos ition probably ha s been the caus e of more unhap pi ne ss 
f or the country's i rilla bita nts than any o t her facto r i n her 
modern history . 
Jutti ng out of Southe as t Euro pe i nto t he Eas tern 
Med ite rranean the Greek peninsula and the surrounding 
islands prov i de excelle nt harbors f or ga i ning mili tary 
c ont1~o 1 of t he Near· Eas t and,~ in this 20th ce n tury , fa cili-
ties for potentia l air base site s . These co ns i derations 
never have bee n overlooked by Europe' s maj or powers who 
cons ta 2.2tly have vi ed for contr ol of t he Near East . As a 
r esult, the Greek people never have bee n able to contro l 
their own de stinies a s befitting a supposedly sovereign 
nation . The term "international pavvnn be s t ca :n desc ribe 1 
Greece 's role in wor l d af f airs s i nce s he wrested her 
i nde pende nce from the Ottoman ~npire i n 1824. 
The United St ates is a l a t ecomer i n the a r e na of 
Balkan poli t i cs . Onl y s i nce the acLvent of the Truman 
Doctrine i n 1947 has the world ' s greates t powe r attemp ted 
to wie ld influe nce i n Greek aff airs . I n the past , fri end ly 
2 
f ee lings had. a l ways existe d betwe E.'n the t wo nat i ons ever 
since Greecers de termined struggle for indepe ndence in the 
l 8 2U r s had e licited s trong syr:1pa t hy f r om a country which 
remembere d i ts own revolt a ga inst f oreign domination . When 
t he United St at e s as s t.1.med its respons ibili t ies as a vmr l d 
... 
powe r through its dec i s i on to contain t he expansion of 
Comrnun i sm, the pr i me motive was once a gain the same one 
which hact sti r:ced. other European countries i n the pa s t --
Gree cers strate g i c pos ition as the doo rste p t o the Iiear 
East. It mus t be stated , howe ver , that the United Sta tes 
had pe r f ormed cha r itable acts f or the Greek people ; t he 
most notab le were the l arge United St ates contr i but i ons to 
u:NRRA and the 1ovork of private r elief organi zat i ons , such as 
Greek "far Re lief, which had. he l pecl alleviate much sufferi ng 
amo ng the Gre e1c peop le. 
Since 1947 United St a te s policy in Greece ha s been , 
(1) the military co ntai nment of Comrnunism i n the Ba l kam.:: ; 
(2 ) the rehabi litation of Gr eece ' s bad l y d i s located economy ; 
ancl the nost i mporta nt, (3 ) the crea tion of i mpr·oved e conomi c 
conditions vlh ich could form a ba s is for the eve ntua l estab-
li shme Et of both social and politica l f re edom. 
The most ef f e c tive po litica l wea pon which the Sovi e t 
Uni on posses ses is the ex i s t enc e of wre t ched economic cant~ -
tions i n most areas of the world . The struggle to co nt ain 
Commu nist expansion by the \vest ca n lea s t hope to succ ead , 
:;;J l 'OVBfil B n e conom c 
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lot of hundreds of mil l io ns is not attempted. The deplorable 
sta te of the s e peoples in Asia , Africa, and parts of Europe 
leaves them highly sus c eptible to f a lse Communist propaga ncla. 
It becomes imperative, therefore, to exami ne closely 
.Ame r ican aid t o Gre e ce in order to evaluate its effe ctiven ess 
in pro·w ting the welfare of the Greek people. For the :free 
peoples of the world) aid. to Gree ce in the pa ct thr ee yea r s 
has be en a vita l testing gr oun~ in deter~ining whether such 
aid and the correct utilization of it can pro ve a po sitive 
a nd effective wea pon aga inst t otalitarianism . The ma 11.-ne r 
in which the pro gr am wa s i mpl eme nted is important in order 
t o di sc over what features were worka ble. This pattern , 
ba s ed on the experie nces i n Greece, ca n prove mos t valuable 
i n ex te nding eco nomic and military assistance to other 
countries in the wo rld need i ng .American aid for purposes 
of SUl'Vi val. 
By ana lyzing r espectively the Truman Doctrine, The 
Eur opean Recovery Program in Greece , the par t played by the 
United Nations in r ega rd to Gre e ce 1 s struggl e with guerrilla 
:fo rces a nd with emphasi s on the role of the United Sta te s, 
a nd the effectiveness of .Ame r ican i nterve ntion i n Greece 's 
domestic affairs , ca n it be de termi ned vvhether United States 
fo r eign policy i n Greece ha s be e n a relative success or a 
failur e. The Lnporta nce of determi n i ng the workable 
features of exte nding .American aid to Gre e ce cannot be 
4 
di~L t i z~d . ~ he pos i t ive achievements of the program which 
can be applied elsewhere may one day pruve the de cisive 
'•· f actor in establi shing s tability and social progres s 
throughout the wo ~ld. 
While it is necessa ry t o pr obe into the history of 
the Greek peopl e for so e unde r standing of their pres ent 
misfortune s , this stud;y n ee ds only a revie·w of the mos t 
salient factors , both economic and political, which have 
occured since the turn of t he c entury . Greece has been a 
cons titutiona l monarchy with the exception of short republic 
i n ter;ludes in the 1920's and '30's. She is governed by a 
Chao ber of Deputies (the Vouli) and a cabinet fo r m of 
government mo delled after the "'i'nglish system vv i th the d.if-
f erence that the cabinet ca n be over -Ghrovm without a / 
corre s ponding dissolut i on of t he chamber. Although nationa l 
parties ex i s t, fa ct io na lism is t he rule . This f ac tor has 
plaf,11.1ed Gre ek politics for decad es a nd little hope is i n 
sight that a cure ca n be effe ctec.l. The monarch in Greec e 
has play ed var~ring roles i n Greek gov ernme ntal life, de -
pend i ng mo s tly upon hi s personality . Th is has re sulted in 
a deep cleava ge in Gr eek po litica l life betwe en thos e who 
favor the r e tention of the monarchy and those advoca ti ng a 
pure r epublic an f orm of governme nt. Although pr esently 
obscured by the Communist me nace, this division is still 
i mpor tant and partly explains the po l ar ization of dome s tic <--
5 
po litics following liberation from the Axi s powers i n l9 4.S: . 
The eco no1D.y of G1 eec e has a l ways b t:: en consiCLered 2 
TThave no tTT econor.1y . os s es c i ng little or none of the re -
sources essentia l for i ndus trial expans i on , the Greeks have 
de r ived, for the wo s t par t, their livel i hoo d f rom the s oi l. 
This i s trag i c be c ause the terrain of Greece i s ill- suited 
f o r intens ive agr icultul'a l pursuits . Less than twe n t;y per 
ce n t of the total are a i s tillable, and ye t over 60 per cent 
of the nat i on ' s 7, 800 , 000 pe Qple active l y work the land . 1 
Conse que n tly, Gr ee ce alvmys has be en requ irea to i mpor t one 
t hird of her f oo d stuf fs . Her main crops are of a seJ" i -
luxury nature such as tobac co, fru it s , o live oil , etc . These 
pr·o vided the gr•eat bulk of her e :zports , but v1hen a de c lin e i n 
wor l d tr ade set i n , these crops were t he f i rst t o f ee l the 
p inch i n the slack ening dema nd . 
Pe rhaps t he worst factor vvh ich has pl agued. t he Greek 
peopl e has bee n the problem of overpopula tion . I n the f ield 
of a gricu l ture, this ha .... resulted i n a wretched d i sproportion 
be tween the c rop l and. available for cul t ivation a nd the f a:r•m 
population a nd couipares with I ndia's p light (about 1 . 3 1 acre s 
per person). 
1 Frank Sraothe11 s , -:-Jill i a1 Hardy l:'lcEe ill , El izabeth 
Darb ishire ":Ic Neill , Re port n The Greeks , (Hew York; the 
20th Century Fund., 1948 , p .---:50-.- ---
The Uni t .El:d ~~Kingdom, for example, has s lightly over 
five acres per pe rs on and the United States about seve nteen 
acres per pers~n . 2 
The Greelc tradition of large families also has contri-
bu t ed to this perp lexing problem. The average Gl:•e ek farmer 
stro ngly believes in having many children who , he thinks , 
3 are insura nc e against old age. But this has resulted i n the 
carving up of the father's meager land i nto smalle r lots upo 
his death. Needless to s ay , the s e increas i ngly small plots 
are barely enough to keep alive a si ngle person, much less 
a f amily . 
Emi gra tion in the early part of the 20th c entury 
al l eviated concli tions s omewhat, but this v.ra s more tha n offset 
by the results of the Greco-Turkish war of 1923 . This wa r 
wa s instigated by a r oya l clique with the King 's support and 
it was hoped that the def eat of Turkey would bring Greece 
much- ne eded ter r itories. The campa ig'TI ended. d i sastrous l y :ito 
Gr eece with an aroused Turk ish aruw inflicting se ve:ce defeats 
In their advance the Turk s upr oo ted over one mi l lion Gr eeks 
from their settlemen ts in Asia Mi no r and for ce d them to f le e . 
This gr e at influx of Greek refugee s n ever ha s be en inte grate 
satisfactori ly in Greece's back'Nard economy. 
2 lblcr,-p. 51. 
3 ··~'l illiam Hardy McNeill nGreece --J?roblem in PovelVty n , 
Dun's Review, Jul y , 1948 , pp . 15 , 16 . 
.After the d.eoacle i n _ sia !·.Ii n or the _ o narch~r a bcl i -
catc.d , a nd. a:l:" t e :c a i' ew shcn t -livell d i ctatorslli·Js , t he 1.:1o r~ t 
no table f i b 1re in Gr ee ce ' s rec en t polit i cal h i s t or y came 
i n t o pov.rer . Elef'th e r ios Venize l os , a dreta n by bi x· t h, hacl 
gain ed promi nen ce duri ng Wo rlCi~ ';far I by s u p po r ting the 
Al lied cause des pite h i s rnonar c h 1 s pro - German lea12ing~ . 
The Venizeles regime (19 2 7--1962) i s no ted f o r i t s so cial 
(.!.J::e e c e ex-o e r ie n ce d t to1·e basi c r eform under the 
ve n izelos re pnblic tha n at a ny other· time i n its modern 
history. A ne vT a n d ultra l i b eral cons t itut i on ado p t ed 
i n 1927; road.s we re buil t ; ext ens ive i mproveoents i n 
water contro l, dr a i na g e and irr i gat i on we re unde rt a k e n ; 
the l arge estates were near l y all broken up and the 
l and red i Et r ibu ted among the pe asants.4 
The s i gn ificance of t he land refo rm is n ever· more 
c l e a r t han it is toda ;y . ' '/hile land refor·m is a gi' eat , 
pe r p l exing problem i n other ~a rts of Europe and the wo r l d , 
the land division carr ie d out u nder Ve n ize lo s has si l enced 
even Commu n i s t s . Thou g h succes s ive Greek gove1·n;•nents a n cl 
Gr· ee ce 1 s -vvealth~r ha v e be e n denouucecL repeatedly, 1,a re l y 
h a s: the i ssue of land l 'eform be en ra i sed , so effe ctive l y 
wa s i t carl' ie d out over tVJo ctec a des ago . 
- ---- ------
4 Smo thers , et . a l., o p . p . 17 . 
' 
7 
8 
The world, de1)ression of the early 1 935 r s ha d its 
i nevitable conse qu e nce in Gre e ce with the rise of fa sc i sm 
u nder Genera l Joh :r1 Eetaxes . The Venizelos gove rnruent had 
b e en swe p t o ut of power and fol lowing uns uccessful coup 
d 1 eta ts , a plebiscite '<Ya s held i n 193 5 in which the Ling ' s 
retur·n t o rule was the re sult o f a hi e,htly questionable voi:B . 
I n the following year (1936) the results of a nat i ona l e le c -
tion revealed that t he tvvo ma in parties, t he Liberals a nd t 
Populists , h a d obtaine d i d e:.Itic a l stH:nlgth in the Chara be.r of 
De putie s . The Cormnu nis t 1:Jar ty, vilh ich had recently exper -
i enced a Boderate gr owt h , he l d the balanc e of ~o~er wi th 1 5 
elected de puties. This s eemi n gly inso lub le situation was 
met wh e n the cha ;:.1b e r ]Jl'oro e;.u..ed for f ive mouths and allovJe d 
the gover11ment under the pre :_!i ership of Iieta::;:as to g overn by 
dec re e . La bor d is putes bec aDe fr equent wh ile Commu n i st-
i nsp i red disorders threat e ned t h e stability of the country . 
I n August of t ha t year ( 1936) the l abor unions , ince ns ed ove 
a gov 6rnrnen t p:coposa l which would ar·bi t:c~ te Y.rage d is pute~ , 
a nnounced a genera l st r·i J\:e i n def i ance . J:he l.:Ietaxat= govern-
me:nt the n ob t<: ined the Ki ng rs signature pr oclaiu ing rnar·tial 
law, declaring a nat i ona l er•l8i'gency , a nd dissolving the 
chamber. The p ropo s e d ge neral s trik e was n i ppe - at t h e out-
set and the Metaxas d ictato rship wa s firmly in power.5 
5 Ed.war- S . Forste r , A Short History of I1odern Gree ce 
(Londo n :i.Iethue n c?c Co ., Lt d .,-l94T}, pp . 193-197-.-- --
g 
The Metaxas dictatorshiiJ ruled fr•om 1936 th.l·ough 
19 41. Also under the Axis occu:9at i on many of its officials 
served under the Germans. The regime was characterized a::o 
in a ll dictatorships by its suppres ::; ion of opposition , 
curta ilme n t of c ivil libert ies1 and establishme n t of national 
youth organization devoted to Metaxas, et c . In the eco nomic 
sphere, Metaxas attempted t o bring about the mode rnization 
of the country. In this matter it cannot be denied that 
some social i mprovements were carried out) but on the whole > 
the regime was bitterly opposecl by the vast ma jority of :: the 
people. Metaxa s 1te l)t hims elf in power through instruments 
us ed by all dictatol'S ~ --the Se cret Police and the army, 
For most Greeks, the memory of the Metaxas dict a torship 
hangs like a dark cloud even to this day, because whenever 
a crisis in political life ari s e 2 . there lie s a strong urge 
to seek the nstro:ng mann in o1•c1er to find the way out of 
the difficulty. 
It was during the Metaxas r egime that Germany 
mana ge d. to capture Greece's exports mal~ket . Through the 
methods of ba:cter agreements~ Germany managed to control 
fifty percent of Gre e k exports in return for which Greece 
received.---nwholly worthless German goods, useless 
quant ities of them on l a r ge credits Germany expected to 
bring--- by the war she prepare d herse lf to declare u~on 
the vw rld 11 . 6 The signifi cance of the se :)erman tact i cs 
be cai"!16 apparent i n pos t - v!8r y ears when G:r• eek exporters 
found i t d i f ficu lt to re - o r ie Et t_ eir tracle else11here , 
after her s t a ture as a German TTeco nomi c captive 1,1 • 
The little soc i al pro Gre s s achiev ed u nder Eetaxa.s 
was null i f i ed by the outbreak of war . Af ter ga l l ant re -
sista nce to the Ita l ians the Ge rwan army com) l etely over-
'fihe lmed the Greek army and the li.ark es t period in modern 
Greek h i story bega n . 
With their 8 ethodi cal thorou ghneEs the Germans 
proce ecled t o st11 i p Gre e ce of its reso u:t:> ces . 
10 
Ori gi nally , the pol i cy of Germa ny wa:::: ---to i n corpora t 
the vrhole economy of this EJ rea in t o t~e Ee·{f Or·de1· o f 
~uro })e under a bs o lute I~ a zi s upremacy . · 
For the most part the Germans lived off the coij.ntri e s 
whi ch they occupied . Inu .. ediat~ly a fter the occupat i on 
bega n German purchasi ng centers ucre instal l e d i n every 
6 Ste phen G. Xydis , The Economy a nd Financ e s o f Greece 
Unde r Oc cu .. pat i on , ( Ee·w York Greek Government Uff ice Of 
Informat i on), p . 4 . 
7 Ibi d , :p . 4 . 
ll 
foo d- produc i ng comrJlUni ty . The re , all go ods '.Jer·e i mrne eli ate l ;y 
re q_uis i t i oned exce p t f o r i nfe l'ior food ~. tuffs Y;Thich were 
g ive n to the G-reek populat i on . Hot onl y >vas the f oo d requi-
s i tic;ned. to be consuned. by the o c cupation force s but ElUCh 
was shi p:_; ed back to Germany:. Dome st i c f oo d product i on :re ll 
of" f t.remendously . ~·!heat pr·o du cti on , f o.r e xa mple, :t"ell from 
~00 , 000 me t ric t ons i n 1940 t o 280,0 00 metric tons in l at e 
1 942 . 8 
The C--errnans carr i ecl the i de a o f barter· a gr e c:rne nts 
i nto domestic Gre ek commerce as well . The urban areas , 
Yrhere near s t a r vat i on ex i ste cl , v1e r· e mo st crue lly affe cted 
as Ge r man ·e str i ct i o:;_1s alhost; r:1ao.e it i mpos s i bl e t o obta i n 
f oo d through l' egu l a:c chan_YJ.e l s . As a re s ult o:t· al l t he s e 
r est r i ctive mea s ures , s uch a s de cre a s e d produ c tion and 
re q_uisi tion i ng by the occupatio n f orce s , the:ce developed a n 
ext re wely harsh i nf l a tion . B;y Hay , 1944 , t he a :.... ount of 
d r ac h.rilae ( Gr eek currency ) i n c i rculat i on rea ched 25 trilli o n s 
or 1250 t i mes the amoun t of money in ci r culat i on in 
9 
·:1arch , 1 941. 
8 Ibi d , p . 10 . 
9 I b i d , p . 44 . 
The Germans considered the Greek ec ono1:1y as a 
liability and we r e dete r mined not to expend a ny of their 
carefully husbande d resources i n pro visivns for the Greek 
populat io n . Whe n wholesale s t~rvation threatened i n 19 43 , 
German autho r itie s permitted the International Red. Cross 
to bring relief into the u rban areas whe re fo od su~plies 
were c r itically short.l0 
When the Germans considere d. Greece no lo nger te n able 
and evacuation began in the surnmer of 19 44 , it wa s marked 
by systematic destruction of trans port a nd port facili t ies. 
Thus when G-reece became co mp le tely libe r ated, there were 
o n ly 21 loco!'no ti ves, 168 fr e i ght cars, and 57 passenge r 
and baggage cars in u s e. Over 1600 miles of railroads we:ce 
l 
useles s ; this was most damaging as Greece's tra nsport system 
al·ways had been inadequa te for the needs of the ec onor.zy . 11 
When liburation ca me, the Greek economy virtually ·was 
prostrate. The retreating Germans were de termined. not to 
le ave anything of u s efulness inta c~and didn't. 
l'G William B. King and Frank 0 ':Brien, The Balka ns, 
(New York: Alfred A. Yillo pf, 1947, p . 2.55. 
JLl The Department of St ate , The Greek Aid Pro gr am , 
Pub. 2939 , Near Eastern Serie s 10, October, 194'1. 
The Greek people, however , did not accept the German 
occupation pas s ively . Within six months after defeat, 
resistance groups began ha1~a·ssiia.g ~~ t he occupation forces. 
The most effective, best-disc i plined , gl~oup was k..11.own a s 
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the EAM ( :£~rational Liberation Front), formed in September , 19 '11 
The fighting a1·m of J£.Al\[ was the EL.AS ( Gl,eek Popul ar 
Liberation .Army ). The E.AlJ i s most impor·tant because its 
existence, not onl y as an anti -occupat i on fighting force but 
as a n i nc r easingl y political organization, was the main 
sour ce of post-libera t i on fri ction which eventually provoke d. 
the terrible civil war . 
The EAM in its. formative stages proclaimed i tse lf 
as a patr i ot ic organization and succeeded, at first, i n 
a ppealing to most Greeks chafing under the oc cupat ion yoke. 
All shades of po li tical opinion were represe nted in E.Al'!I 
and EA1d committees were to be found in villages scatte red 
throughout the country. Its most militant orga nizers and 
le aders gradua lly became to be those i de ntified with the 
poli tica l Left . In this category were some professed 
So cia lists, agra:cian reformers) and a great nW11ber of 
Communists. The l atter eventuall;y achieved complete contro l 
of the movement and e0nseque ll,tly: c. U. ited::!:i i t for the ir own 
po liti ca l ends. 
It must be n e ntio ned. that other resistm:ce movements 
a l so opposed the occupat ion for ces. The most notable was 
EDES (Gr eek Democratic liational Army)1 co n11 ·1ande d by Genera l 
Na poleon Zerva s , a pro::t' e ss ecl political r i ghtist. However , 
none of the se other inde pendent rno veue nts could claim the 
relatively l arge popular support i:AE claimecl for i tse lf. 
Host were factions ba nded to gether by l oy a l ty to their 
le aders. 'l'he s e grou ps, i nc l uding E.Al1 , received supp lie s 
a nd a rms from the Bri tish who , a lthough non-discrimi natory 
i n the ir assista nce t o those gJ:·ou ps at f i rst , cut off 
supplies to EA1'1 i n t he l att e r sta ge s of t he o cc u ::>at io n . 
It appears that EA1T and ELAS de l ayed attacks on 
German occupation forces 'Nhe n ordered to attack by the 
:British i n the f a ll of 1943 . But the really i mpo r ta nt 
reason is that EL.~;lS managed to defeat its rival, .GDES , and 
consequent ly stre ngthened the Br iti s h belief that ~N.I really 
was aimi ng at comp l ete political monopoly v.rhen the day of 
libe r ation arrive d .la 
E.A.t"\1 re pre sentat ives -vvere g i ve n po s ts i n the libera -
tion go vernment . But te nsion developed when E.AM refused t o 
al l ow ELAS to di s a:rm , EAI.i charg i ng that the British were 
arming a:n.d suppor ting the ir ri ght i st oppone11ts . Cla shes 
broke ou t be t ween ELAS and British troops and the f'o:c:::1er 
12 Smothers, e t . a l., ~· cit, p . 22 . 
wer e defeated in a battle which r aged in Athens f or several 
we eks . The Varkiza Agre ement of February , 1945, signed by 
E.Al:i a nd the :Sri tish, called for the eva cuat i on of Athen.s 
by EAM, the turning in of a ll arms by ELAS, and the disband-
men t of ELAS as a fi ghting body • EAl•I the n ret ired to the 
mountains a nd evidence remains that not all of t he arms 
were Eurr e::lde r ecl . Within a few sho:ct months, guerr illa 
activity on t he :part of E.AM bega n increasing , this time 
agains t succe ss ive Gree k gover·:::nne nt s . 
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This is very impo rtant be caus e the existence of t he s e 
bands and their i ncrea sing strength were the biggest 
obstacle s to the so r ely-ne eded rehabilit a tion of t he d i s -
rupte d Gre ek ec onomy . Whateve r chanc e t h ere may have bee n 
of u niting the count ry f or the diff i cult tas:l;:s of recon-
struction disappeare d with this cle ava ge . 
However, not all the blame can be placed on E.A1I in 
its decision to continue oppos i t ion to successive British -
s pons ored Greek governments . V/he n the Left was clefeated 
in its abortive attemp t t o seize powe r , the co nse r vative 
forces we re detel'mi ned to ma ke them. pay :~ Confident of 
suppo r t from the British, the political Ri ght exploited 
thei r newly-won power a nd i ndiscrimina -t; e ly lJUnishecl every 
person who u ildly p:eote s te d t heir vindi c tive a ctions . It 
should be said that the Briti sh were no ne too ha ppy about 
these Cievelopoe nts but to ok 110 active steps to ha l t the 
persecutions o1· rna11y innocent persons . Their unfortuna te 
position can be surnmed. u p thus: 
••.• Right i stlil'. (Greeks ) believed. that , no matter 
'.7hat sor·t of gove l':muent the B:c i tish mi ght want , the 
latte r ~ou1u o~ compe l led to support the m in the 
future as l ong as the onl~ a lternat ive ap peal' 6d. to be 
ad.mi tting E.AH to :._)ower . 1.o 
An in~'vitaole polarization of Greek po l itics only 
made matters worse . 
16 
Whatever· oppo :ctuni ty a L.lOtle r ate center gl,ou:J may have 
acl i n gaining control v.ra s nnll ified_ by extre!nists on bo th 
the right and left. This tragic state of affa irs provided 
a great di l emma for the ineffective center groups and is 
swnmed up i n these words : •••• nthe fe e l ing that it is 
necessary t o support what you be lieve to be bad i 21 ordel" 
to fi ght wha t you co :!:1Side :c worse . 11 1 4 
Bri ti sh policy i n Gr ee ce at t h is time was sha rply 
qu es tioned both in Great Br· itain and i n the United States . 
Pr i me : i n i ster 'd inston Churchil l was accused by many element 
in both countries of actively wor1cing f or the return of 
-----·---
13 Smothers, et . a l . , £g · c it., p . 28 . 
1 4 Geoffrey Char..dl er , 11 8-reece --Rela })s e or Re-co v.BJ."y?n 
International Af'fa i rs , Vol. 26 , Apri l, T9bO ., 9-.-11::35 . 
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the monarchy , r ega:cdle ss of the d ictates of public op inion 
in Gr ee ce. The i s sue of the monarchy had be en fi erc e l y 
debated in Gree ce for decades. But it wa s agreed u9on by 
all parties that a plebiscite be held as soon as possible to 
a llow t h e Gre ek peop le t o de ciCie. 
With the conservative forces firml y in power in the 
go verrunent , it was decided that na tional ele ct ions be he l d 
as soon as possible . The EAM, whos e popular ba cki ng had 
decrea s ed sharp l y , oppo sed the idea of nationa l elect ions 
be cause its prest i ge had decli ned and it stood little c ha nce 
of mak i ng any inroads i n the Greek e l ectorat e . How·ever , t h e 
Gr eek government pressed f orward and nat i ona l electio ns 
t he fil'St in te n years---were held in March, 1946. 
As a g:ceed beforehand , the elections we re obser·ved by 
an internat i ·:ma l body known as the Allied Iii ssion For 
Obs ervance of Gre eJ: Elections. .4 .. LiFOG.E wa s composed of 
re presenta t ive s from the United :S t a tes, Great Britain, and 
Fra nce. The Soviet Union was i nvited to j oi n but dec lined , 
the reaso n obvious l y being that she f elt certa i n that t he 
6ommu~1.ist l eft woul d be dec i sively beaten . As t h i s 
app ea1·ed :CikelY--- to oe cur, the pre s e nce of the Soviet Union 
on the allie d tea~ would then l end the e l ect io n an aura of 
res pectability , thereby depl' iving the Soviet Union of a 
powerful propaga nda wea pon--the charge that elections we r e 
1 
::cigged in f avor o f the react i onary c l iqu e s of Gr eece • 
.As i t vms , E.AJ,I a nd its sympath i zel' S boy cotte d the 
e l ec tion charging tha t e l ect i on lists were f i xed to their 
d i s a dvan t age . Ov e r 2 40 teams of AllFO GE members wi t nes :::: e d 
the bal l o ti ng a nd it wa s e s t i ma t ed that the E.&H boycott 
a uw un te d t o about 20 :per ce n t of t he Greek electora t e . The 
result was a f or egone c onc lus i on . The c ons e1·vative f orces 
were vic t orious , e l e c ting 231 ou t of the 354 menbe r Ch amber 
of De put i es . Ap proxi ma t e l y 60 :per cent of the Greek e l ec -
t o rate vote d . The moderate fact i ons gai ne cl only 48 sea t s • 1 5 
The AHFOG~ r eport sta t ed that : nThe Gl' e ek elections--Here o 
the who le fre e and fa ir, and t he ::cesults re pr e s e nt a t r u e 
v a l i d verd i c t of the peo :p ~e , i n the c on s i d er·ed judg1nent 
0 I" ,\ 7 ·"" 0 (!.,.,.. 11 1 6 ..l.i ... :..: ..:....L· ~ .r...~ . 
Although d i s crepanci es d i d occur duri ng the ballot i ng , 
there i s l itt l e doubt tha t t h e conservative v i ctory r ea l l y 
::ce pr e s e n t ed t he se n t i me n t of the Gr ~ ck pe ople . It wa s a f~ 
of Com.rnun i sm vvhich prompted the Greek e l e c tora t e to swing 
ma rked l y t o the ri ght . Th is expl a ins i n p art the abse nc e 
of a ny effect i v e mode ra te c enter g rou;J Bl' i sing and. be com i ng 
a v i tal f or ce i n the cru c i a l po s t - war y ears . 
1 5 Smothers , e t . a 1. , o 1) . c it . , p . 2 9 
1 6 Report of the All i ed. Mi ss i on to Obse r v e Gre ek 
El e c t i ons , De pal~ tm.e nt of---sTate :Bulle ti n-,-voL XI V, No . 35 5 , 
April 21 , 1946 , PP• 671- 67 3 . 
1 
The great majority accorded the conservative factions 
i,e. the Royalists, in the Chamber of Deputies also was 
destined to prove a headache for the .American Mis s ion which 
insisted. on !~Jodera te govermnents ·which, by . necess i t;y, 
required conservative baclcing . 
The Royalist victory in the general elections r:1e rely 
paved the 'Nay for the return of the mo:!.'larch~r . In Se ptember 
King George II was called back after an affirmative t wo to 
one plebiscite vote . Greek lJO li tical moder·ates v,rho YJere 
re publica ns charged that the pleb iscite was fraudulently 
helCL, but t his cha1•ge was passed over. Undoubtedly the 
monarchy becarae for many Greeks the symbol of anti - Cor:r ..munism. 
Throughout the entire po st-liberation p Griod. , United 
States po licy tovmrd.s Greece ""vas that of nA caut i ous 
17 s pectator· and nothi ng more. 11 It a ppearec1 that the Unite d. 
Sta t es ·was willing to allov: Great Britain to guide GreE:< ce, 
providing no extreme measures lJrevailed . There was much 
s ympa thy on the part of Americans fol' the Greek people V.Jho s e 
lot had been most wretched. But l ittle in the line of 
d irectly influencing evt:nts was attempted by Amer ican 
di) l omats in Greece . It was'truly the easy way out as far 
as the United States vvas conce rned but , as the fates willed 
it, this a ~oofness was not to last long. 
1 '7 . Klng and 0 1 3rien , op . cit ., p . 260 . 
CHAPTER I 
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
A sense of u,rgency and a nxi ety characterized the 
Admini s trat i on 's de c ision to _commit the United St a tes as a 
f'ull-time partici pant in the po s t-war world of pov-;er poli-
tic s) be gi nning with wh a t no-vv comL1only is known as the 
Truman Do ctri ne. Ye t this determi nation to che ck the sprea d 
of Communism was tempered by t he knoYv ledge that the proposed 
a ction unquestionably would e nt a il great r esponsibilitie s 
on the part of t he United St a te s f or an i ndei'i n i t e pe riod 
of time. It is little wonder that high off icials i n the 
Uni ted ~ t a tes were apprehensive a bou t thi s new, momen tous 
undert aki ng i n a time of rela tive peace; it pl ac ed t he 
United ~ t a tes in the role of active oppos ition to the ex-
pans i onist po licy of the Soviet Un i on . 
The grimne ss of the situa t ion waE: r e flected i n 
.l->re s ide nt Tr uman 's mes s age de livere d befor e a joint se ss i on 
of Congress on March 12, 1947: 
11 The gravity of t h e si tuatio n whi ch confro nts t he 
wor l d t oday nece ssit2t es my app eara nce befor e a joint 
se ss i on of Co ngre s s. 
The forei gn po licy a nd na t i ona l secu::ci t y of this 
country are i nvolve d . 11 
The Pr e side n t went on a nd SDOke of the ha r dships 
u nde r go ne by t he Gre ek peop le during t he war. He sa i d tha t 
t he count r y of Gre ece ne e d.e cl help, boti l1 econor1ic and 
milita ry , and that the United States mus t supply these 
ne e ds. He empha s izecl the danger pr·esentec:t by bands of 
Communis t -le o. i ns urgents i n Greece and the havoc they were 
creating . If Greece were to suc cumb to this mi no rity, h e 
s aid , the stability of the whole Near East wou l d be 
jeopardized . But the most i mportant :par ts of his s:peE'l ch 
were the s e: 
ni believe that it mu s t be the po li cy of the Un ited. 
States t o support f ree pe op les who are resisti ng 
attemptec1 subjuga tion by armed mi!J.Oi'i ties or outsi de 
pre s su_r;e s . 
I believe that we must a ss ist free peo ple s to work 
out their own dest i nies i n the ir own way. 
I believe that our· help should be pr imarily througg. 
eco nomi c and financial aiel which is esse ntial t o econor.1i 
st a bility and o:cd.erly pol i t ical p::co c esses. 
One of the primary objectives of the foreign po li cy 
of the United States i s the creation of co nditio ns i n 
which we and othe r na tio ns will be able to work out a 
way of life free from coe rcion ." 1 
The pr·e s id.ent's speech was a blunt, for•thri ght 
statement that the United. s t at e s , if Congre ss co ncur r e d., 
meant to h old the line i n Euro pe in s u pport i ng a11y frie ndly 
governmen t which f'elt need of a ssi s t ance i n combating 
narmed mi norities" and resi s ti ng rroutside presr.-: u reE" . 
The i mmedi a te background t o t he dramat ic a nnou n ce-
ment that economic and mi lita ry aid to Greece v1as i mpe rative 
1 Department of State, Recommendations on Greece a nd 
Turkey , Publication 2785, Near Eas tern ~er ies b, 1947, :p-:--I. 
zz 
lay in these imlJortant preceding eve nts . On Februa1'Y 2 4 , 
1947, the British gove rnment ha nded United St ates off icials 
a note which declared t hat Great Br i tai n woul d no longe r be 
ab le t o fulfill her fi nanc i al comrnitments i n Greece beyond 
March 31, 1947 . This decis i on on the part of the 3ritish 
gove r nment wa s prompted by her steadi ly weakeni ng economic 
condit i on . The severest winter i n rece nt history had forced 
the shutdown of many ~nglish fa c t ories. This pro vecL critical 
for· Great Brita in, as s he ne r; ded t o export ma:rmfac-Gured_ 
goods i n o 1~der to i mport vi tal f oocl stuffs . The resultant 
effect was that it was e s s ent i a l to pa re off h e r como i tment s 
throughout the vro rl 0. in or·de r to conserve her dwi nd ling 
res ourc es. 2 
Bri t ain 's i ntended withdrawa l caused co ns idera ble 
consterno t i on i n off icia l c irc les i n the United St ates and 
i n fo rrr..1a l notes \?ere e :x:ch<=_1gecl , di s closing the extent of 
Br i ta i n r s r e l i nquisl'EJent of fina nc i a l s u pJ!ort t o Greece . 
Another 1·acto1' which aclmi ttecl ly wa s given the v.tmos t 
c ons i derat i on wa s the i rnr:-1 ine nt te:r;. ~1inat i on of U:tTRRA. Th i s 
i nte rnatio nal relief orga nizat i on had be e n mos tly responsib le 
i n ma i ntaining the Eubsist e nce l evel of life in Gr e ec e sin ce 
that country 's libera t i on i n 1 944 . The peop le of Gree ce had 
2 Hov..ral'd IC . Smith, The State of Europe, ( lifev; Yo r 1c: 
Alfred A. K11opf , 1949 ) pp .-z8-29. 
23 
received 35 4 millions in UNR~A SU]plies of which the United ; 
2a States contributed 72 per cent of the total. It must be 
added t ha t pra c t ically all of thi s wa s in the form of cl ir·ect 
relief VIi th the re s ult that li t tle was expe2.1ded for vi ta l ly -
ne e de d reconstruction purposes. 
A third fact or whi ch t:coubled United States of f' i c iaLs 
was the i n creasing po vver of the i nsurgents. I t was clear 
that t h ese Cornrau nist-led gue r r· illas wer·e the to o l s of Soviet 
Uni un forei gn policy and v1ere cl etenni n ed to bring about the 
overthrmv of the Greek governLTl en t . At{\other sour ce of c on~ 
cern relative to the civil war was the substantial aid i n 
the form of weapons an d s u pplie s the i nsurge nts were r~ -
ceiving fro m the Soviet satellites in the north. Thes e 
countries v;ere Alba n ia, Bulgaria , and Yu goslavia, all of 
Yifh om fo rmed an unfriendl y cordo n around Greece ' s porthern 
borders . 
r.rhese then were the factors v.rhiC.h we re wei ghed by 
.Ar.aerican forei gn :po licy pl a nners before urging the Admin-
i stra tio n to take that l ong step--active suppo r t of a 
:fri end l y t;ove r nme n t in que l ling subversive activities 
i ns ti gated by a vmrtime ally, the Soviet Un i on . 
2a New York Ti mes , I:;larch 21, 1947. 
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But t op Ame rican o f f ic ia l s h a c. been Vjell a wa re o f the 
de ter i orat i ng economic and military conditions fo r some time. 
Br i taL1 ' s announc e r~1e~t of hel' i nt8nd. ed. v:i t hcl rav·Ja l 'Has no t 
e n t i rely u nexpe cted . Ye t, the d.ate se t for Br i t a i n 's -vith -
dra·>"ia l a ppe ared t o hav e exci t ed the Adm i n i stration no end . 
The i '·up:ces s ion ga i ned was t hat Gree ce v..ro uld f a ll V•r ith i n days 
a f ter the Br i ti s h ·wi thdre w. T1 is vms a f a l se as s UI!1pt i on as 
events prov ed . Actua l a i d under the Truman Doctrine d idn ' t 
r each Gree ce unt i l four mon ths hence ancl the c r :i:ti ca l aspect 
of t he s i t ua t i on i n '}re ec e d i d not take a s drast i c a change 
f o r the nors e at: the Admi n i s tration warned i t v;oulcl. Al so , 
Br itish t roops d i d no t le ave Gr ee ce u ntil :~ovembe r , 1949 . 3 
The })O i nt be i ng bro u @;ht out here i s tha t the f i rst 
great post - war under t aking on the part of the Uni ted State s 
vv a s prese n ted i n a man ner d e s i e;ned t o p1•ovoke fears and u n -
c e 1· tain t y . There can b e li tt l e or no <.;_uar:ce l v1 i th the case 
f or e conomic a nd nili ta r y aid t o Gr ee ce. I t vms a grea t ges-
ture , e ven though nat i ona l intere s ts may ha ve d i ctated it . 
But t ' _e admi2.1ist1'at i o:n ' s i nsista r:ce that pas sage of the bill 
be c oncluded i~ilecliately gave ri ~e to doubts and fears about 
VJ.ha t its i np licat i ons ;n i g 1t De . CrnEeq_uEnt l~y , pa.s._,a::;e o f t1e 
mi::~isti·at ion iJac._e E1a:r1:v lo~e Si[;ht of the L18St valuable as pect 
of the pr·o gJ: ar, --fu nds for he l p i ng re c onstruct Gre e::_ eco no .1y . 
ca Bo ok of t he Year Chi cago, Toron t o , 
London : Encycloped i a J ri t am1 i oa ~ne-;-1950) p . 303 . 
" London Ec ono:-,1ist vvhich closely observed. the proceedings in 
Congres s , comr;1ented that: 
••• 
11 presuma bly, 1\Ir. Trwnan 's advis o rs felt it wa s 
neces s a ry to touch the ant i-Russian s pring to sec"lue 
the support that woul d not have been forthcoming ior 
a me a sure r epr esented to be truly huma n itarian.n 
The ultima t um form of p:.:_·e s entat i on proba bly was due 
to the odd a nonaly of .Amer i can const itutional structure--
the fact that the l e gisla ture was controlled b~ one poli -
tical party and the executive by anothe r . I n this instance, 
the a clD. i n i s tration was co nfronte d by a Repub li can-contro lle c1 
economy- minded Congres s vv-hich was hi ghly c:ci tical of the 
fo r· e i gn c ommitr.i1en ts of the exe cutive. The sincerity of the 
Administration is wi thout doubt . But it ap pears that the 
military aspects of t he pro gram appeared to hav e be e n more 
co nvincing than economic as pects of the pro gram. 
But before members of Congress were willing to vo t e 
f unds for the im pleme n tation of the pro grar.tl , ma ny po i nts in 
the President ' s me s Eage ne e ded cla:r·ifi cation . One disturb-
ing ~uestion troublin g the %nerican pe ople a nd their 
Congre s smen was whether the a id pro gram would establish a 
precede n t irrevocably coniLli ttin g the United St ates to a id 
countries which cou pl<:3 ined. of a Commu n i st me nac e fro m 
4 The London Economist , Vol. CLII , lio . 54:0D, l.Iarch 
1 5 , 19 47 ,-p; 377 . 
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within, whether the menace vvas serious to that nat i on or 
not . Acting Secretary of State Dean .Acheson mollified these 
feal'S by s a;yi ng that the Uni ted Sta te s r,ras not contenp la-
tin g a n ide ol ogica l crusade ae;ai ns t Commu nism. He stated 
that the ad;:..r1 i nis tra t i on was concern ed s pe cifica ll;y only 
v;rith Greece and Turkey at tha t time . Al thou gh Ache so n 's 
stat emen t wa s non- commi ttal it apparently wa s acce j? ted as 
satisfactory by inqui:r·i ng le gi s l a t ors . 
A further clarifica t io n) slic;h t a s it was_, on t h e i n -
plica tions of the program d i d. come smne mon ths later in an 
addres s delivered by Loy W. Henderson , then Director of the 
Of f ice of Near Eastern and Africa n Affairs. In referring 
to a ny t'u ture aid. ~ Mr . Henders on said., nIt should 1)e clea r 
that the form and the a mo unt of the a i d to be g ive n by the 
Un ite d S t a tes must de pend on the cir·cun1st a nces of the case . 116 
The administration's hedging on this question was justifie d 
as future events brought out. A bro ade r pr ogram ror exte nd-
i ng aid to other coun trie s was i n the ma k ing , and it would 
hav e b ee n u nwise for the A~1inistration to cot~it itself 
with a s pecific ans we r . 
5 The Depa rtment of S ta~ Bulletin, Vol . XVII, No.343~ 
October 19, 1947, p.----rr'l'tJ. 
\ 
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The most troublesome as pect of t he pro posed program 
f or Congres s vJas that one half of the ai d. f or Gr eece and. a ll 
a i d f or Tu~key would be mili tary i n nature . Di d this n ea n 
t hat .American troops eve ntually would be sent if mili tary 
conditions becar.1e ac u te? Administrat i on s pokesmen nere 
euphatic in say :i.ng that no American troops would be s ent. 
The fear abounded t ha t if .America n troops ·were se nt, i t 
ai ght provok e the Soviet Unio n in retaliatory action and 
i gnite a general confli c t . But it was ex;;1 l a i ned that a 
mi litary mi ssion of Ameri cans wo u l d advise the Gree k a rmy 
and s upe r vi se the di sburs eme nts of funds under the milit a ry 
as pe c t of the pro gram. Th i s wa s a ccepte d by the leg i slators 
but it is ce rta i n that i f the us e of troops were con tem-
plated the aid bill never woul d have been a J..J proved by 
Congress . 
The qual ity of the Gr eek government was a l s o under 
fire as di splayed. i n the debate s i n both bra nches of Congres 
and a ls o i n t he comrai ttee hearings . The alleged reactiona ry 
chara c ter of the Greek go vernment r,ra s gi ven great promin-
ence. Severe cr i ticism came, nu t only fr om the expected l e f 
wi ng sources , but also from those i dent ifying theo selves 
with the h i ghly c onservative f a ctions. newspa per dis pa tches 
or i g inating i n Gr t ece had des cr ibed the vi c ious , r eta liatory 
tactics sa nct i oned by the Greek goverrunent in it s struggle 
with the insurgents . The Administration d id. no t 
-- l 
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atter1pt to g ive the Greek government a clean bill of health. 
It:: pos i t i on wa s that the gover1-:rne nt was re pres ent ative , 
basing i ts premise on the results of na tiona l el ec tions of 
Iv:a rch , 1946, in Greece. 
Acting Se ere t a r y Ache son in a COIDlni t tee he a r· i ng 
co mmented : nin Greece to da ;y , we d.o not have a choice betvvee :n 
a perfect demo cracy and an impe r f ec t democrac y . The ques tion 
is whether there shall be a ny d_emo cracy at all . n 6 
United St a te s policy i n r ega rd to the po litical make up 
of Greek gover~~1ents can be assessed from the followi ng 
statements of po licy. I n the ~ay 1~ , 194~ i s sue of the 
De partment of St at e Bulletin there a ppea red this statement: 
"We off er no apolo gies for the pres ent govern...me nt i n Greece. 
It obviously do e s not co nf orm i n certain re spec ts to our 
particu l ar s tanda r ds of pe rfection . n7 
Again , an a ddress delivered by As s istan t Se cretary 
Henderson i n another clar ify i ng stateQent months after 
the aid pro gr ao was in process : 
6 Hearings Before The Commi t t e e on Foreign Rela t i cns , 
U. S . Senate , As sistance t o Gree ce and. Turk ey, 80 t h Congr·e s ~ , 
Fir·st Session , Iila rch 2 4 , '25 ,2rr,-3.1-;--T947, p . 10. 
7 Th~ Department 9f State Bullet in, May 18, 1947, 
p . 998 . 
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Wiife would. be disposed. eq_ually to coopera t e with any 
other leade rs who mi ght enter the gover11L1ent re ga1~dles s 
of whe t her they might be of the Right , the Center , or 
the Socialist Left , provided we are satisfied that 
they enjoy the support of the democratic Greek people . " 
There can be l i ttle doubt that the Uni ted St ates did 
want a represe::.1.tative go ver11L1ent to function in Greece . 
Charges that United. States pol i cy was opposed to libera l for'c s 
i n Greec e are false. This is very i mpor·tant . Polic~r mal{:ei'S 
felt ve ry certain that no financial aid pro gram was likely 
t o succeed if it condoned anti-pro gressive mea s ures on the 
part of goverrunents which it supported . As will be discusse 
in greater detail in a l ater cha pter , 9 the libera lization of 
the Greek governments became a cardina l pr inciple in the 
i mplementat i on of the aid pro gram . It is s ufficient to say 
that although the military aspects of the program became 
domi na n t i n the Tru.rnan Doctrine there was grea t co ncen1 for 
personal liberties on the part of the Administration and 
Congress . 
I n essence, the Truman Do ctrine, as it unfolded , be -
came more of a holding military action l' a ther tha n a po sitive 
construct ive financial pro gran . AdmL1.istration s po1resmen 
constan tly stressed the strategic position of Greece in -'Gheiir 
statements before Congress io na l Sommittees. 
8 The Bulleyin, Feb . 29 , 1948, p . 274. 
9 Cf . pp . 97 -100 
3 
As dis cussed previous l y, this s eemed a more effe c t ive ne thod 
of ob t a i n ing co:ngre s s i on8 l a ppr·ova l I' a t her than en1phasi z ing 
the :~urely htllllaDitarian aspe c ts of' the p la n . rlhat probably 
convi nc e d. aany l egislato rs was Acting Secretary Acheson 's 
stater en t that the v:rh o le nea r East ·wul d. be th1· eat c: ned. 
critically if the line co u l d. no t be he.ld. i n Gr ee ce •10 Th e 
pro gram vias pre sen ted. to be meTe ly te r.1po ra l'Y in nature and 
the exp i ration da te VJa s se t f or June 30 , 1948 . By that time , 
i t was f elt, Gree ce v.rould be v1e l l enough : to a c quire fur t her 
assistan ce through regular channels, such as the ':/orld na n.lt 
f or Reconstr u c tion a nd De v e l opment ancl th11 ou gh the various 
age ncies of the Un i ted ~ations . 
On l!i.ay 22 , 1947 , the BOth Congre ss passed Pub lic 
Lavv 75 rendering 400 millions in economic and fi nanc i a l aid 
t o Gree ce and Turkey . ll It was with sincere a isg ivings on 
the part of ma ny legisla t ors that the bill was a pp:uov ed . 
Mo s t Congressmen votec1 for the bi l l be cause no conctructive 
a lterna tive rerila i ne d . Their reaso n i ng seemed t o be tha t a 
nega tive vote vvould be t antamo un t to a pro - Comrnu nist vote . 
10 Hear i ngs Before The Co~nit te e on Forei ~1 Re l ations , 
80tp. Co ngress , :l!, i rst Sess-io n , I'.Ia rch '2'Cf; T94?T: _ ___  
ll De pa r t me1t of State Bull e tin , Ju1 Ac t For Assistanc 
to Gree c e and ':CurJ{e;>r , Publi c Law 75, SOtnCongres z , 
Se ss i on , I.1ay 22 ,1947 . 
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The Truman Doctrine es sent i a lly se1·ved as a wa r; n i ng 
t o the Soviet Unio n . It gave no ti c e that the United States 
was \Villing t o utilize its res ou:cces in r es isti ng any 
p r-es s ures which the Soviet Union mi ght bring to bear on 
independent nat ions . 
It must be stressecL that there v1ere i r.1:porta :nt qual -
i ficat ions inhere nt in the impli ca tions of the Truman 
Doctrine. One was that military and econoudc aid would n o t 
be g iven u nle s s there was a better than ev en chance that 
success coulu be achieved in re si s t i ng the e ncroachments of' 
Coritnunism. This mea n t that count ries with i n the Soviet 
Orbit v~o ulu not ge considered as qt:talifying for aid . 
The T:t'UJnan Doctrine could not then · be cons i derect as a 
sweeping meaeu1·e design e d to throw up a barrier i n evel'Y pa 
of the wor l d. where uommunist i nro ads ·1>Je1'6 be ing made . The 
Doctrine can then be c onstruec1 as a merely te mporar y ex-
pedi elJt whej~· eby :fina ncial aid , both n i litary and e co no;:nic, 
is e:xt t: nde d to countries only where the national i ntereEt s 
of the United States are co ns ide red thre a tened . 
The marmer in v7hich the Trmnan Doctrine was to be 
effe cted is i mportant f or t hese reasons . (1) A pat t e rn 
needeu to be developed so ae to establish a precede n t for 
t h e e x t e nd i ng o~ Qi litary and economic aid to countries i n 
si.::ila r st:t·aits as the natio:.'l of Gre e ce :found herself'; 
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(2) the attemp t to determine whe ther .A.rDe rica n fi na nc ial 
ai d could p rove sut·ticient in stemmi ng the spread. o:r oornumn:Ern 
without using Amer i can tro ops. 
Before the Unite d S ta t es wa s willing to exte nd a i d 
to Gr f. ece, a s sura ~c es from the Greek goverrune nt were needed 
concern i ng the orga n ization ot· the .A.tilerica n mis ::: io n which 
wou l d i mplement and s upervise the aid program. Adm i n i s -
tra tion officials were deterLi ned to bting about the mos t 
effe c t ive u s e of American aid f unds in Gre e ce. Conse quently, 
the typ e o1' organi zation which the mission would h a ve and 
its s co pe of autho r ity in i mplementing the pro gr•a r.1 ~7ere of 
hi gh i mpo r t ance. 
In it s i n sistence that direct supervision of a 
pro gram by Jilll.ericans vvas neces sa r :t , the experience e n tailed 
i n the distribution of UlffiRA relief supplies wa s a d i s -
t a steful one . During the operat i ons of UNRSA~ the distri -
bution ot relief su p plies had been unsatisfactory from the 
_tuneri c m.'l viewpo i n t . It had be en charged that Ti.luch of the 
supp lies had ende d up in the black market because o!' i n-
adequate supervi sion on the part of UI.!RRi\ .. officials .12 
Adm i nistration off i c i a ls as a result vvan tect explicit 
guarante e s tha t American aid wou l d be supe rvise d thoroughly 
by an Amer ican 1 i s s i on . ·These guarantee s were 1'orthcomi ng 
JL~ 0 'th ' 1i' J) n_. ~ ~ r/- 2 9 8 . e:. om J.. , op . ~--·, ..., ..., ..., "' 
in a Greek government note ~ which stated: 
nThe Greek government wishes to t ake this opportu-
nity to r enew t h e request t o ~ne uni ~ e u St a t es 
Governllent for Amer ican persoYJ...nel who can as s ist in 
the Greek re covery effort , including a special .Aiuerican 
:Mission to a d.mL ister the extensio n of .American aiel 
and observe its use by fb.e Greek eovel'l'1.'".11ent and advise 
the Greek Gover:nme nt." 6 
The Uni -'Ged States had be en 1-vell aware of the half-
hearted. , i neft'ectual atterapts by succ es sive post-vmr G:t·eek 
Governme nts in promoting po l itical and economic stability. 
In the early part of' .. _l946, for example, the United Sta te s 
Import-Export 3ank had loaned the Greek g ove :cnment 
25 million dollEn's and in a no te had urged the Greek gov-
er lJlnent to pursue a more const:cuctive dor.2estic polio:/ . The 
no te in part said : 
••• 
11 it (the United States goverru.ne n t) is co nvinced 
that the a Es ista ~lCe being exte21ded t o Greece ca n 
acJom:;:Jlish little towa1·ds economic recovery unless 
the Greek go ve rnment itself underta.1-;:es rigorous 
measures to control i nflat io n and to stabilize the 
cur.r·ency, t o reduce governmen t e xpend.i tures and to 
augwent r evenue, to increase efficiency of the Civil 
Service Ifl.p.minis tra t i on , and to revive i ndus try and. 
trade.ll 1:1: 
13 Ra~~ond Denr1et and Robert Q. Turner, e d itors, 
Documents on American Foreign Re l at ions, (Prin ceton Univer -
sity Press; \'"Jorle:L Peace Foundation, -i949) p . 680. 
14 The De partment of State Bulletin , January 
20 ,1946 , p-;rT9 . - . 
As far as the Admini s tration was concerned , these 
same pri nc iples he l d true a s the aid pro gram be gan t o u nfo l d. 
The specific tasks of Alii.AG {.American 1ii ssion for .Aid to 
Greece) vvere m8 de clear by Under- Secretary of State Vli lliam 
L . Clayton before the Senate Fore i gn Re l ations Co~nit te e . 
I 1'l a prepal"Bd st atemen t he saicl : 
11We must see to it that COI!l.pe t e n t persons are sent 
to Gree ce to i nsure the developu1e n t of co nt:co ls at 
k ey po ints and to supervise their ap plications ••.• 
in such mat te rs as the fol lowi ng---a mo de r·n t ax 
s tructure; strict husbanding and control of the forei gn 
e'xc·hange earn ings of the Greek people; c ons e rvat i on 
of rema i n i ng go l d resource s ; res triction of ur~sse nt ial 
imports ; and expansion of Gr e ece's exports.n .5: 
The s e task s as outlined by Under-Secret ary Clayton 
corapr ised. the heax•t of the eco nou1 ic side of the aid. program 
to Greece . Whatever success .Al:LI\G might achieve in the 
e conor,1ic sphere depended l a rgely on some solution to the 
a bove knotty pr o blems. 
Specific recommendations for carry i ng out the need.ecl 
economic r efor·ms were pres ente d by Paul R. Porter who 
recently had returned fr om Greece afte1n survey ing G:r eece ' s 
economy as Chief of the Ameri ·~an EconoL1ic :t.~i ss io n • 
.Ambassa dor Po rter and his staff hacl been sent to Gre e ce on 
Jan uary 13 , 1947, by the Admi nistration at the re quest of 
15 Assistance to Greece and Turkey , Hea l ings before 
Senate Fol.'. Rel. Oom .-,-op . cit ., p. f!J1. 
the Gre ek government. The Por•tel' His s ion i s very i m11ortant . 
Its fi nding s and recormne ndat i ons pr oviued ·the ]Jluepri:nt 
wh ich 1-U.I.A.G f ollowe d i n i mpleuent i ng the eco nomic aid 
pro gram. These basica lly v1e re the recomme ndat ions and pr o -
posa ls in the Porter Repo ~t. The Gre ~k go ve rnme n t should 
(1) i n crease r eve nue s by overhauling the tax structure; 
(2 ) re duc e military expe nd itur e s whereve r possible (this 
proved i mpo s sible); termi nate costl~r su_bsidization of 
utilities ; u s e auditi ng and acc ounti~g syst ems i n the gov-
ernrnent ; review pe n c:io n listc: and dema nds; and elimi na te 
Hs pecial fund.s n; (3) conse rve fOl'ei gn e::~change by restri-
ction of unes s e ntial i mports; (4 ) stimula te ex po rts by 
(a) fi nd i ng new markets , (b ) u tilizing teBpo r ary ba r ter 
a g r e e11en ts, (c) subsidi zations of some commo clities, and ; 
(5) reform the overexpanded Gr e ek c ivil service . 16 
The Porter Report also s t a ted that direct controls 
over the eco nomy were neces s a ry . Selective pri ce co ntrols, 
re nt contr ols, and a genera l wage poli cy t o be undertake n 
by the Gr e ek go vernrr .. l8nt were advise d . Greek i ndus t r y 
should be expande d by (a) gra nting i mport licenses f o r raw 
16 The De partmen t of St a te Bulleti n (Su pple r!:lent), 
Aid to Gree c e an d Turlcey, Vol . XVI, J:'o. 409A, May 4 , 1947, 
PP • 899-90~. 
36 
materials r a the r than manufa c tured goods, {b) an i ndus trial 
development prograu Tih ich could utilize Gre ek resources 
a nd (c) exte~ding credit to a ppr oved i ndustrie s . The 
development of agriculture could be furthered. by (a) ca r e f ul 
u s e of sca r ce water thr ough ir .r· i gat i on and dr a i nage , (b) i n-
te ns ive crop gr owing , (c) educatine farmers in modern 
methods of a gricultural produ ction .12 
With the above blue pri nt provided as a guide , ·Al:IAG 
officials arrive d i n Gree c e in the late s pring of 19 47. 
Af ter the Gre e]{ cabine t appro ved t he as s i gnrne nt of AIVIAG 
s pe ciali s t s to k ey positions i n t he Gre ek gove rru-:1e nt, the 
a dm i n i s t ra ti on of the pr ogram bega n . 16 The most i mpor t ant 
pos ition occupied. by an .Amer ica n in the structure of t he 
Gre e1>: government was t he pos t of Chief of t h e Foreign Trade 
AdL i n i s trat i on . This a ge ncy "vas co ncerned v1 i th the l' egula-
tio n of i mports whichwas ac compli shed by the r·e quiremen t 
tha t a ll Gr eek i mpo r t e1 s obtain i mpor t lic e:cse s . Th e sti-
mulat i on of Gre e ce's export s was a ls o a prima ry duty of t he 
Foreign Trade Admin i s tration . In the nece s s ary ta s1c of 
overhauling t he ta x s tructure of Gr eece, ~1AG t ax experts 
received pos itions i n the Mi ni s t r y of Fina nce . The s pe c i f ic 
l~ Ibid , p . 906. 
16 ilew York Ti mes, June 17, 19 47, 6 : 3 . 
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duties of these s pecialists in the 1\Iinis tr~r of Financ e 
vJ ere the f o :r·mula t i on of p l ans f or bala ncing the bud get, a 
mo re euq i table levy i ng of taxes, anct t h e collec tion of taxes , 
a tas};: in which Greek gover:nruent s of the pa s t had. b ee n mos t 
l ax . The third imr o r t a n t agency in which Am.ericans v1e r e 
i nst a l l ed wa s the Curre ncy CoEmli ttee. This body had b ee n 
established by the Briti sh go ver11rnent in January , 19 46 , a nd 
1ovas the pr i nc i p le brak e on mi Di!"J. izing t he d i sas t r ou s effects 
of ir..f l ation . Three Gree 2-cs , ur..e :Sngli shman , and an ..:~'T.le rican 
cor::tpr i s eel t h e co rnrn i tte e vr i th an u nani mo us vote need.ed. f or 
any decision . The Curl"ency Committee app :t"ov ed t he i ssu a nce 
o f additi ona l notes by the Greek government a n d main tai ne d 
c ontrol over the u se of foreign excha nge. 19 
Much va lua ble a ss istance was g ive n to AJ.:Li\.G officials 
by the Bri t ish r.rh en AlLi\.G a ssumed its du t i es i n Gre 2ce . The 
3ri t ish exper i ence i n g ivi ng Greek gov ernm.e n t s ec onouic a iel 
had be e a pa i nful one . Ther e had be en no agr eement between 
Gre at Brita i n and Gree c e tha t the British Ec onomic l:ii ss i o n 
20 would s upe rvi s e expendi tures . Th is had re sulted i n little 
c onst l,u:Jtiv e spe nd i ng of :Sr i tish a i d funds by Gr eel-;: gove r n -
.. e r:. t s . '.I'here i s l i ·Gt;le d.uub·~ tha t United S t a tes c,eter·mina -
tion t o co ntrol t he use of a i d funds was c ons i derab l y 
19 The De partr:lent of St a te, The Gr e ek .Aid I'l"ogx·am, 
Pu b . 29 39 , He a:c Eas tern Series 10, Octooer-;--1'947· . pp . 9-12 . 
20 Geoltifrey Cha ndler 11 Gr e ece- Relapse or Recovel'y? 11 
I n t er12at i onal h-ffair· s , 26 :181, i:,.pl'i l, 1950 . 
i nflue n ce d by the Bri tish experie n ce in Gree c e . 
As one half of the aid J) l'Ogl'ara to Greece was devoted 
to mi litar·y purposes , it was impel~ative that a military 
adviso r y staff be sen t to Greece . Top policy pl anners i n 
the United States co ns idered this illi lita ry staff the most 
i mporta n t as pect of the. Truman Doctrine . The Gre el{ a r1113· 
had made little headvray in cleaning out the gue rrilla 
s t rongho lds , and a thorough reorga nization of the Greelc 
army was neede d . When the milit al~y o ission f irst a rrived 
in Greece , it pos ::: e ssed a staff of 105 pe r sons . 'iihe n the 
ter;:nination of the civil war' came about in the fall of 
19 49, the number h a d inc rea:::ecl to 508J de monstrating the 
irnportc:nce of the military a id prograr . ~J1 The t ask of 
training the Gre elc al'rny in guerrilla warf a r e ·was very i m-
po .r t ant . Al t houtsh Br' i tish 1. ili t ary missions had trained 
the Greek army after the liberation , li t tle i nstruct io n i n 
guerri lla t actics was taught. This e xplained in part the 
i nabi lity of the Greek army to li Quidate th e guerri llas 
despite overwhe l ming superior·i ty in numbers and. eQuipment. 
It be came ve ry clea r that before a ny r ea l effor t s in 
the reconstruction o f the Greelc economy coul d. be at temp ted., 
~1 The Seve n th Re po rt to Congr e ss on Assistan ce t o 
Gree ce and Tur k ey, For period Ended l'Iarch 3 1, 1949 , The 
Departme n t of S ta t~, Au gust , 1949 , p . 1 6 . 
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internal security had to be established. Priority , there-
fore, was give n to the r es toration of tl' al1Sllor t and port 
facilities. Construction of these roads was da nt;erous due 
to roar,1 i ng gue:crilla. bands which terrorized the countrvside • 
., 
The critical military situation can be estimated i n the 
light of the fact t hat the i nsurgents controlled most of the 
rural areas with government forces in conJGrol of only the 
large cities and main lines of corar::mnications . 22 Thus, in 
order t o protect the vital ce nters of population and to free 
troops for offensive ope:cations a gainst gue r r i lla forces, 
Greek National Guard units were :fo:cmed in order to pol ice 
them. This only put a further drain on the mili tary budget, 
thereby di verting added funds original l y earmarked for 
reconstruc t ion purposes . 23 
As a result of the grave military situat i on, the 
Truman Doctrine too1c on the defi nite cha r acter of a military 
operation . This can be attested by these fi5ures ; the 
n i li ta loy needs after one year co l1Sll.t'Tled l? 1, 850 , 000 do llars 
or more than 30 millions more tha n origi nally was intended.m 
And in the remainder , theoretically devoted for c ivilian pur 
po ses, more than half we nt into the rebuilding of comwuni-
22 :New Republic, Feb. 23, 1948, see map p . 13 . 2~ The Sec ond Report to Congress On .Assis t ance to 
Greece a nd Turkey for Period endi ng Deceml:Jer 21, 1947 , p . 6. 
24 The Fifth Report to Congress for period ended 
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cation f aci lities so vita lly nee ded for the pro s ecution of 
the wa r. In the final anal;ysis, a ~- small fra ction of the 
·-funds ea rmarked for reco nstruction purposes actually were 
utilized as i nte nded . 
I n the eco nO.mic sphere , however, the re we re ac com-
plishments which need to be no ted. Runa',vay i nfl at ion which 
ha d be en a gre at source of wo r ry to MqlAG Officials and to 
the Greek governrnent \~ras slowly being checked. The mo st 
effect ive way ~ ith which this was a cc ompl ished was the 
immediate i mportat i on of c onsu..rne r go ods which had bee n 
s orely l acl\:ing . With .American a i d funds, a balanced budget 
was achieve d , thereby eliminating the issuanc e of mo re 
pape r money ne eded t o cover the deficit which otherwise 
would have been the ca s e. 'W ithin three months after .AliLAG 's 
arr ival in Greece the amount of money in circulation h a.d 
bee n r educe d by ten pe r cent i n relieving the pre ssure of 
i nflatio n .25 
Ano ther accomplishment of conse q,uence wa s effec t ed 
by the Foreign Trade Administration. I n order to overcome 
the pro ble121 of the overva lua ted d.ra chr:1a, a certific a te plan 
was i nstalled to stimulate Greek exports and obtain badly 
needed foreign exchange. Esse ntially , t h is plan subsidi z ed 
25 The Sec ond Report, op . cit., pp . 17-18 . 
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expor·tere at the ex:Jens e of importers . The plan v1o r ked in 
thie mam:: e.l' . Exporters upon re ceiving foreign excha ~:1ge for 
their products vvou l d turn d.ollars or s terling into the Bank 
of Greec e which woul d then give these expo r ters certifica t es 
s t at i ng the amount of foreign e~change . The expo~ters , of 
cou rse , a l so re oe i vecl. the e quivalent sum in Gr eoJc cur·renc v 
- ~ 
or drachma e at the off'ic ial rate , which vvas then 5 , 000 
draob.r.nae t o the dollar . These certificates ;,7ere the n allO\·,re 
t o be sold. in the free ma:cke t. Gree k i mpor ter, n ~o eding 
foreign exchange , wer·e t hen obli ged to buy these certificate 
on the f re e market after ob taining im:po~ t li censes from th e 
Fore i gn Tr ade Administrat i on . The free rna l'ket l'a te for the 
drachma was 8 , 600 to the dollar which the i m:po:c·ter had to 
pay for the use of these certificates . Thi s d. id s erve the 
:purpose of bri nging into line the over eva luate d dracb.,11a i n 
rel a t i on to the real ·va lue of f oreign exc hange and. s timu-
l at i ng Greelc expol·ts . 26 
As t h e fi rs t ye a r of the i mp l ementa tion of the Truman 
Doctr ine came t o a close, it was very c lear that only one 
year of _1\mer ican aid. would no t be suff icient t o provide bo t h 
mili tary and e c onomic sta.bi li ty . 
26 Ibid pp . 20 -21. 
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But the concrete achievements of the Truman Doctrine 
in i ts first year of i mple mentation ne ve rtheless were im-
pres s ive . The most i n ; orta nt a chieveoe ~t was , of course , 
the maintena:2ce of the Greek na tion as a fre e country . Eo 
l onger vvas there the fear that the Gree1<: gove r nm.ent coulcl 
be overthrown by a handful of a r me d. rebels . As a result, 
...; oviet foreign po licy received its first concrete setba ck 
in Greece i n the immed i ate post-wa.r yeal"'S . The :plan , e n -
visage d. by Communi s ts for a Ball{an Confederation of People's 
De Hocrac ies, had to be abando:r: ed. , at lea s t tempor- a1·ily . 
Another sig:nificant result of the Trwnan Doctr·i ne 
\vas t hG reOl'ganization of the Greek army. Rugged. fighting 
i n the mountains of Gree ce agains t the guerrillas was 
slonly mo l ding the Greek arr~y i n to a tough, eff ective 
orga n izat i on . The i mportance of this cannot be over l ooked . 
A Greelc a:cmy reasonably able to take care of itse lf wo uld. 
do much t o disc oura ge any pote ntia l a ggr e ssor in the Balkans . 
Aside fr·om the achievements al1·eacly di scussed , the 
fi l 'S t ye a r of economic aid to Gre e ce could not clisclose 
many othe r a c complish1~1ents . But for the purpose of this 
study , it is rna i n tainecl that i.'lUCh wa s a c comp lished . Just 
the atte mpt by the .Araer i ca :n Mi s ..... i on , 1\llAG , to b:cing about 
improvewents in the Gree k e conoDy was i mportant . This meant 
thCJt the United States was actively intere Eted i n bettel'ing 
t he e conor,1ic lo t of the Greek pe op le and was not co ncerned 
on l y with ho l d i ng the line a gai ns t the expEms ion of 
Comr.!lu n i sm . 
Through .AJ./I.AG ' s un tiring efforts t he Greek people r s 
hopes vre:re r 8 i s ecl. I nstead. of a lethargic, i ndiffere nt 
at t itude bred from despair , the Greek people began t o look 
i n to the future once more vv i th conf i denc e. 
I n v1eighi ng t he posit ive effects against its 
negat ive aspects , the Truman Do c trine does show a favorable 
ba l anc e sheet , sl i e:;ht as it may be. The milita ry situation 
had i mproved a nd the s eeds f o r the reo lgani zat i on of the 
Greek econ omy were so.vm . 
It rema i ned the t a sk of the ~uropean Recovery Program 
to bring into frui tio:n the first st eps taken u nde r t he 
Truma n Doctrine i n the revit a li zat i on of the Greelc economy . 
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Ca tegor ie s of expend i tures for ec onomi c as s istance 
under Public Law 75 . (One year of aid under _,.- ,L4.G}. 27 
Re construc tion proje cts ••••••••••....•. 
Farm and industr i a l 
ma chine:cy and suppli es •••• • ••.•••••••• 
Fo o d • • . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Pub 1 i c He a l t h. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . ... 
Other Gooo .. s ancl Service s •••.•••••.••••• 
AJ\I.AG (Pe:csorme l and Admi n .) •••••••.•••• 
Constune:c goods and 
ra1.· ' mate.:r- i a ls •......................•. 
Housing • •. _ ............................ . 
Loa11S t o ind.u s t:r.·:y •••.•...•....•........ 
Loans to Agricul ttu·e ••••••••....•...•.• 
Sa r1i t a t i on . ........................... . 
Tota l 
20,500,000 
18 , 800 ,0 00 
30,800, 000 
1,400 , 000 
400 , 000 
4 , 200, 000 
42 , 800 ,000 
1, 600,000 
300 ,000 
600 , 000 
200 , 00 0 
12T:"61.fCJ.ooo 
' ' 
27 The Si xth Re port to Congress On Assist ance to 
Gree ce, Tur key , p . 11. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ElJROPEiJ'T RECOVERY PROC-R.Ali I N GREECE 
As the Trwnan Doc trine was pl'ima rily a r.J.ili ta:cy 
ho lding action and co nseque ntly l es s devoted to the problem 
of ec onomic reconstruction in Greece, the re storation and 
development of Gre ece ' s dislocated economy remained the 
task of the Euro pea n Recovery Erogram . Common l y knovm as 
the Mars ha ll p la n , the Euro pea n Program f or most Greeks was 
merely an ex te nsion of the Tr un1ar:. Doc trine . Yet , ba ~ ic 
differences e:xi:::ted. . I n its ince ption , the Truman Doctr i ne 
was f ormulated hastily and was mot ivated by the feal' that 
Greece VIould perish as a free nat i on if i mmed iate ass istance 
were no t rendered. 
The f r ame rs of the :Suropean Recovery Pl"Ogl'am t oo1c the 
long ra nge viewpo i n t that the ma i n objective of ERP was the 
reol"ganization of the Greek economy so that , in the fore-
se eab le futur e, a reaso nab l e de g ree of self- sufficiency 
would be attained . As one writer observed in commenting on 
ERP in Greece : aFor the fil'St time there is an attemp t a t 
a thorough reol"ga nization of an economy that until now has 
bee n jo l ted along by a succession of expedients .n 1 
1 Chandler , op . cit , p . 184 
Although the framers of ERP theore t ica lly regarde d 
economic recovery in Gr eece as only a small part in t he vast 
pro gr am of Eur o pean Recoveyy , i n l"eali t y , Gr eece ·was c on-
s i de red a s pec i al case. Thi s u n iCJ.ue position vms of cours E; , 
due to the civil war which r aged. vvhe n ERP assurned its tasks 
i n Gr ee ce. But t h is hand.icap only e mpha s izecl the impol~ta nce 
of ERP . Here wa s a vital tes t f or the effe ctive ne ss of 
.Arnerican fi na ncia l ai d. in attempt i ng to create order out of 
t h e economic chaos which wa s Greec e. The pos itive achieve -
ments of ec onowic as s istanc e to Gree ce for ·ne thing c ould. 
refut e the a :t gume n t vvh ich s till had ad.here n ts---thnt eco nom;L 
recover·y i n Greec e via s subol'G. inate to the strategic i nterest 
of United States f ore i gn policy. If a so lid basis for the 
revita l ization of the Greek eco nomy could be established 
under the European Recovery Program , it wo uld g ive conclus iv 
proof that Uni t ed States fo1'eig.r1 policy d.oes hav e as one of 
it s te nan ts the economic improveu en t of people s throughout 
t he vw.rld . 
A brie f background of the Eul'opean Recover·y Pr og:r•a ril 
is nece ssa ry befor e proceeding wi th an analysis of ERP 
effo r ts in G-reece. (The first ment i on of ERP which created. 
public i n terest came in Secretary of State Georg e c. 
Marsha 11 '· s s pee c h on June 5 , l 947 , in c omrnenc eme nt ex er cise s 
at Harva rd University .) On that day Secre tary Marshall 
a~~ounceQ t hat large sca le 
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f 
economic aid to Europe wa~imperative if both eco nomic and 
political stability were to be restored on that co ntinent. 
The Se c retary of State spoke of the harctships undergo ne by 
Euro pean peoples and the extent of econorn ic dislocation 
prevalen t in Europe. The United St ate s, he said, was will-
ing to extend aid providing Euro peans to ok the i nitiat ive 
i n formulating a program . 2 
The res pons e from Europe an ca pitols was irnme cliate. 
Foreign Minister Bevin of the United Kingdom took the lead 
sugge sted by Secretary Marshall and i nvited all i nte rested 
Euro pea n c ountries to confer• in Paris, including the Sovi e t 
Uni on and her satellites. :Sut the Soviet bloc quickly 
wi thdrew when Soviet Union Foreign 1\linister T•!Iolotov's 
proposa l calling onl y for the pre se:rrtation of a list of 
goods needed by European countries to the United Sta tes was 
turned. doym by other Yves tern Eui'opean countries. The Soviet 
proposal•ad.de d that each Euro pean country could then Utilize 
.Ac'11erican a i d as it saw fit V'l i th no inte rfei'ence by the Unite 
St ates . ~eedle ss t o say , this was co nsidered i mpo s sible 
b~y the United. States which was dete r r:.1ined to ove rsee any 
expe nditur es uncle r t:ake n under the pro gram. 
2 The Departme nt of State Bulletin, Vo l XVI, Eo. 415, 
Jun~ 15, 19 47, pp . 1159-1160. 
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Despite Soviet opposition, momentur.n vvas gained in 
the surnr.ae r of 19 L.b7 in establishi ng a European organi za tion 
which could. as ses :3 Europe ' s nee cls . The 'CO llllil ittee for 
European Eco nomic Coope r a tion , cornmonly know as CE:=C, was 
formed and repre se nted a ll European countr i es \'f i shing to 
:pa rticipate in the 3uropean Recovery Progr am. This bo dy , 
whi ch l ater became the :per ma nent Orga nization for Euro pean 
Economic Cooperation, i ssued a re po rt s tating Europe's 
ne eds for economic r ecovery. 3 This report wa s mos t com-
prehensive a nd was i ndicative of the tremendous a ount of 
:prepara tion which chara cterized "che f orraul &t i on of' ER.l-' . 
This was ve ry ci. iiiel'e l1-~ :tror.J. the nake s hift pr·e para tion of 
the Truman Doctrine. 
Throughout all of these de liberations, Gr eece, though 
a full participant i n all discussions, was considere d by 
C~EC a nd OEEC a s a spec ial ca s e because of the internal 
situat i on i n Greece . As 03EC present ed its r ecommenda tions 
as to Yihat sum each ERP country should re ceive , under the 
program, Gre ece 's de plorable e conOLiiC status would re q_uire 
a larger share of ERP funds pure l y for relief purpos es. 
3 Committee for European Economic Cooperat i on , 
Ge ner a l Report , Depa rtme n t of State , Se ptember, 19 47. 
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Thi s was t aken into co ns i derat ion by the United St ates . It 
be ca r.1e obvious that G-reece, for mili ta :cy purposes alone , 
would require much more aid tha n could be given her solely 
as a part ici pating co untry under ERP. 
In a ski ng Congr ess for the funds needed f or the 
i mplemen t a tion of t he European Reco very Program , S ecretar~y 
Marshal l said.: 
TIThe intensifica t ion of guerrilla warfare ••• has i n 
fact increased the needs for both eco nomi c and milita :cy 
assistance to Greece. 
Funds provided under the ERP of cour se , will not 
be ava i l ab le for military as s istance to the 4Greek arc1y in its fi ght aga i nst t he !§."Uer:cillas . 11 
Co nseque ntly, Congre ss authorized 275 o i llions mo re for 
purely military as s istance t o Greece and Turkey when the 
Europea n Recover•y PTograrn was a .ppr oved i n the spring of 
1948 . 5 
The Foreign Assistance Act of 19 48 made it mandatory 
that .American IJ!issions be set up in the capito ls of each 
partici pating ERP country. The EGA Mis s ions ·~ ··~ in general, 
were organized alo Yl..g the s ame line s a s was .AMAG in Gree ce. 
Both the .AltLAG and ECA Missions were concernecl. with achie-ying 
ma ximum results with .Arnexican aid funds and clo se ly SU:;;JBl,-
vised a country's disburs erneDt of these funds. But in 
4 The De :partment of State Bulletin , Vol XVII I , 
No . 45 4 , March I 4 , I948, p .~17. 
5 Public Law 472, 80th Congress, Chapter 169, 
4:9 
Greece, ECA i nherit ed all of the wide advisory functions 
of ·-~~:AG alo ng vvi th it s r egular duties. In achieving this, 
an i n ter-de .t:'artme n t a l agreement 1- as reached betwe en the 
=c onomic Cooperation Admi n i stra t io n and the De }a r t men t of 
state which had di1.,e c ted the Gr ee}: aid pro gr au u nd e r .A!..IAG. 
The i mportant feature s of this agreement were, 
( 1) so '1e of the civil a dviso ry functions of -u.-I.AG would be 
plac ed unde r the jurisdiction of the ECA lVIi s s i on Chief and 
(2 ) the .Arnerican sA.tubassador would be rna de he Bd of AliA.G a n d 
wo uld assume respons ibility for a ll other a dvisory func tions 
e:xce ·•t t hose re l a ted to EEP . 6 
But not a ll of A.IviAG ' s func tions were taken over by 
EGA . The mos t important , JUSHAPG (Joint United St .st es 
lfili tary Aclvisory and Pl a1mi ng Gr oup), cont i nued to advise 
the Greek a1·my . As this was a non-civilian natter , JUSI.IAPG 
repor·te d t o the American Ambassac'Lor a :nd not to ? CA. The 
a ppoint ment of He nJ:';Y F. Gra dy as .American Ambassador a nd 
also chief of mi ss i on in Gre ec e eliminated the fri ct i on 
which developed when the he ad of AR.~G and t h e previ ous 
America n 1·nbas sac.l..o r· to Greece cla she d over ma tters o:f 
Am erican policy in Greece. 
6 First Report to Con gre s s by the Eco n o;;1 ic Coo perat i on 
Administ at ion, p . 51. 
The mos t i mmediate and pressing pr oblem confr onting 
the 3CA Iviission in Gre e ce v~as the large nwnber o f re f uge e s 
who were fo r c ed t o fle e fr om are a::: whe r e fi ghting wa::: i n 
progr e ss . By the f a ll of 1948, the ~ e r efuge e s t o t a led ov er 
700 , 000 p e r s ons . The tr agedy of t h is wa s e n hance d by t he 
f act tha t mos t were f araers, resulting in a fur-ther cur t aj_ l-
ment of Gre ece' s inade qua t e f oo d pro duction . On e t h ird of 
G-reece ' s populat i on at ·t h e h e i ght of the c ivil war wa s 
. ' - t 7 1. na 1. ge n • Th e prese n ce of one qu art e r of a mill i on men 
i n the army a l so cut d ee p l y i nto the limite d manpower which 
Gre e ce n e ede d fo r the huge ta sk of rec ol1St r·uc tio n . I n 
caring for these refug ees, it became n ece s:::a r y to utili z e 
f or relief pu rpose s the funds o ri g i nally e ar'ma r k e d f o1· 
r e co n s tru c tion . This was a r egu l a r p r ac tice up Lm til the 
civil vva r wa s e n ded a nd the number of refugee s we re r e -
se t t le cl i n their home s or s ettle d e ls e whe r e :on recla i 11ed 
l and under :S'RP . The fir s t y ear a nd on e h a lf of l~RP aid 
5 
re sulte d in mere ly k ee _p ing t h e Gr eek e conomy o n a mai n tenanc 
bas i s with little pro g res s i n t he :r.· eco nst r u c tio n o f the 
8 
Gre ek e co ·1oE1y. 
7 Nevr Yorl<:: Ti me s , Apr•il 24 , 1949, 16:6. 
8 Greece-Coun try Study, 2co n oo ic Go o _perotio n 
A~1inist rau i on, February 19 49, pp. 4-'7: 
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Both EGA and. AivlAG approa ched the IJ l'O blem of re con-
structh:..g the Gre k econo my \.vith the principle of mel' ely 
observing t he proper use of funds and advisi ng the Greelc 
governmen t on u s i ng construct ive me thods in carrying out the 
objectives . This self- help princip le was no t acce pt ed i n 
its full meaning by many elei11e n ts of the Greek population. 
This Cl'iticisrn is not inte nded to belittle the contr ibution 
being rllade by Greeks i n their fight against the i ns u rgents 
nor is it i n te nded to minimize the terrible sufferings 
undergone by the Greek popula tion . The i nd is put a ble facts 
show that the Gl"e el{ peop l e suffel~ed more than a ny other 
Europe an peop les. 3ut, unfortuna t e ly, the Gl' eeJuo who v7ere 
not maki ng the utmos t efforts to contribute to the recon -
struct i on of their natio n 's economy were those posses s i ng 
capita l for investment. Both _A.E AG and .:::. CA h ad_ to CO T.Llbat 
this defe a tist attitude . As a result, prac tica lly every 
r e comotr·uct i on pro ject \7a s fi nance cl by American funds i"li th a 
s mal l fra c t i on backed b;y· private Greek ca pita l. 
The reluc t ance on the pa rt of Greek ca pitalists to 
i nvest their raoney in Gre ek entel' pris e s developed i n to a 
psychosis . Possessors of badly-needed ca yital de ep l y feared 
both the guer.i' illas and possib l e invasion fr om So viet 
C• 
satellites in the north . "' ThusJwhatever i nvestments v1ere 
9 Greece Country Study,~· cit ., p. 2 . 
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made were those Vlhich yielded immediate, l arge :profits •10 
Conse quently, imrJor tat ion of luxury goods took :pre cede nee 
ove:r vita l capital goods. As pointed out, this was cur-
tailed by the Foreign Trade Ad.~inistration in l ate 1947 . 
The FTA establi shed the policy of granting licenses to 
i mporters of capital goods before all owing luxur;y goods to 
Er:te r Greece . 
The l a ck of confide nee in the Country's fu tu:ce was 
manife sted i n the mania for gold sovereigns displayed by 
practically the entire Greek population . These go l d sov-
ereigns were avidly collected and then hoarded . So ~er-
sistent was the de mand for gold that both .!0:.LAG a nd :-:<::C A 
reluct ant ly gave permission t o the Balli;: of Gr eece to 
rele a se go l d bull ion he l d in a New York baru~ for sa le to 
ll ~ the Greek public. ~Chis was done to cou:n ~.~eract infla tion-
ary movements which were developing and to stabilize the 
price of go ld which had risen ra pidly in the face of d.e mand 
for it. 3ut the s e measures of ex;ediency onl y served to 
reduce Greece's :pos s es:::ion of valuable foreign excha nge. 12 
10 Geor·ge Polk , HGreece :puts us to the Testn , Har r's 
Maga zine, December, 1947, pp . 530-31. 
11 Third Report to Congress on Ass istance to Gree c e 
8 nd Turkey for Period ended March 31 , 1948 , p . 9 . 
12 Tenth Report to Cong:r·ess of the Economic Cooper-
at i on Administrat i on , Sep tember 30 , 1950 , p . 7. 
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This general apatby of the Greek people was dist:cess-
i ng to both JJJAG and ECA officials. It a ppeared that the 
hal~sh German occupation and the ensuing civil war had sapped 
com.~letely the Greek people's vvill to help themselves. 
There was a genera l feeling of bitterness and frustration 
at the bad fortune that had befallen them and an inclination 
t cl f · · t the 4 r J"ust due. 13 It · t o regar oreJ.gn assJ.s ance as ~ J.s o 
the credit of both .AHAG ancl ECA that in the i mplement a tion 
of the aid pro gram this form of self-pity was rep l 8 ced, if 
on ly slowly at first, by a definite rise in spirit. This 
i ntangible factor is very difficult to measure , but its 
i mpo rtance became mo1'e evide nt as recovery in Gre e ce gained 
momentum after the li quidation of the guerrilla forces. 
Despite the t remendo us obstacles confronting it, the 
EGA Hission in Greece set a bout the t ask of the restora.tion 
and development of the Greek ec onoL1y . The pr inciple vehicle 
for effecting this wa s the couEterpart fum1 . This fund 
became an es sen tial charact eristic of ERP in every partici-
:Pa ting count:r·y. The counterpar t fund wae merely the sum of 
money which each country receiving ERP grants deposited in 
a special account. The swn of money deposited was equal in 
13 John Gunther, Behind The Curtain , (New York: 
Har·per & Brothers), 19 49 , p . 13-rr:--
5 
that country's currency to the g1•ant g ive n under ERJ? . The 
participat i ng countries reimbur s ed theo selves for the amo un t 
of money deposited in these s pecial account s by selling 
.American do llars to persons, for· examp le, who needed dollars 
for fore i gn purchases. When each purcha s e i s appr ove d by 
ECA , t he importer then nbuysu the dollars v.r ith l oca l curr e 
Ea ch pur chase under E_P is c lo se l y supervised by ECA 
officials who fulfill their dut ie s in seeing that a ll pur-
chases contribute to the nations r e covery program.l4 
The counterJ.Jart fund actual l y serves t wo 1:urposes . 
:I:i'in:;t, dollars pul·cha s e badly needed i mports and -. se condly, 
the lo ca l mo ney used to tTpurchaseu the dollars is us ed for 
furthering the country's r e construct i on efforts. 
Another use of the counterpart fund is t o restore / 
fina nc ial stability, particularl;y by cor.1bating inflation. 
The fund can be used to " freezen the amo unt of money in 
circulation i n order to re duce the effe c ts of inf l ation . 
In Greece this was done as a matte r of fisc a l poli cy . I n 
one period of threatening i nf l Htion, over one trillion 
drachmae ( 67 millions in do llal'S ) was t aken out of ci l' cu l a -
tion.15 But t his Hfre e zingTI only reduces the a mount of 
14 Counterpart Funds--Eu rope's Contribution, :::::conomic 
Cooperation Admin i stration , l'Jiarch, 1950. 
15 Greece - Country ~tudy , ~·cit., p . 24. 
money avai la ble for r e construct i on projects . 
~o counterpart f unds were suppos ed t o be us ed for 
milit ar y expe nd itures . But i n the pr os ecut io n of the war 
against the guerrillas, the Gre el\: governraent re pea t e d. ly 
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. i ncur r ed overd.l"afts at the Ba nk of Greece . As mo re pape r 
mo n ey woul d have had t o be pri nt ed to cover these ove r 
drafts , the counterpart fund neutra lized this by Lre ezing 
funds and checking another r ound of i nf lation. It ca n be 
s een that the counterpart funds ne ce ssa r ily ha d to be u s ed 
fOl" i ndirect military purpose s ) if on l y to kee p Gre ece's 
cre aky f i nancia l struc ture fr om La l ling apart complete l y . 1e 
The true va l ue of the coun terpart fund could not 
t he n be appr e cia t ed unti l the fi na l dispersal of the i n-
surge nts was achieved . Th is would lea d to re ductions of 
mili t a l'Y expenditure s, t hereby a llowir~g ~CA officia ls and 
the Greek governmen t to conce ntra te on r e co nstruct i on 
prob lems . 
;'/he n the civil war was brought to a suc cessful c on-
elusion i n October 1949, the r ea l job of reconstructing 
t he Gree1r eco nomy was j us t be g i rm i ng . As a n ECA report 
s t a t e d , 11 The pres ent s t ate of the Gre e};: economy i s mo s t 
near l y comparab l e to that of the other :pal'ticipa nts two 
1 6 Lo c . cit . 
years ago , before the beg in:ni ng of the ERP . 11 17 
The Eu1•opean Recovel~y Pro e;ram had two objectives . 
The first was the rehabilitation of weste rn European e6on-
omies . Essentially thi s Ll eant l'e pairing the d.ao a ges in-
flict c d in the course of the war . The second objec t ive or 
p!1ase was the de ve lopDle n t of the economies so that a higher 
standard of living could be attained. In the case of the 
Greelc people, the latter was absolutely imperative, co n-
side ring that the ave1,a ge annual income per capita in pre-
war y ears was 80 dollars .l8 
I n order to a chieve this objective --a hi ghel' sta :c1.d -
5 
ard of living--EGA officials we11 e convinced that it could be 
attainable on ly through the industr·j_alization of Gr eece. 
This does not necessarily mea n concentration on heavy 
indus try but was inter pre ted to :mea:u. d.evelopmen t of s mall, 
light industries such as f ood proces s ing, mining, textiles, 
etc. The cost of t h is overall lo r15-range p rogram will be 
a pproximately 545 . 8 r~1illion dollars of which three fou1·ths 
wil l be devoted to the actual i ndustriali za tion of the 
na t Lm. It is expected that 203 millions of this sum ean 
be provi ded by Gre e ce from sums she expects from l'epaxat i ons, 
17 Greece, Country Data Bo ok , Economic 9ooperatio~ 
Administration, Chapter I, Marc h , 19 5~ 
18 Greece , Country Study , op . cit., P• 28 . 
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foreign i nvestments , bl ocked sterling ba l ances , etc. 
Before t his long-ra nge ind.ustrializa tion :progr:Jm 
could be accoElplishe d , an i n t ens ive deve l opment of Greece 1 s 
hydroe le ctr ic capacity was conside re~ imperative . ~cA 
Mi ssion officials and the Gre ek governmen t estimated that 
within the next ten years , this progr am woul d cost 200 
millions in do l lars . Work was begun on this proj ect i n 
December 1948 and is continui ng today . Thi s l ong range 
hydroelectric pro gram ca lls for five pov1er pl ants wi th a 
t r 6 r;:; 0 • t' 
1 9 t total capaci y of J u , 00 k~lowa 1jS . I is envisaged. bJ,' 
E GA p l anners that hyd.roe lectric pov1er l ines would cover the 
who le of Gr ee ce. This deve l opment would not only provide 
the bas is for the fur ther i ndustrial i zat i on of Greece but 
woul d. also free Greece from im:LJorting fuel f.'or her indus -
tries . 
These five pro jec ts would be scat tered throughout 
Greece , and. it i s expected that they wi ll also be use1'ul 
for purposes or fl ood contro l and irrigat ion as ~e l l as for 
b.yd..roe le ctric power . This pov1er plant pl"O gram >by 1'al1 , i s 
the 1.1ost ambit i ous attempt under t aken by any GreE>k govern-
ment in modern history . Gr eece's future l ies in the 
ba l ance . I f the i ndustriali zation of Gree ce can be achieved 
1 9 Ibid ., p . 30. 
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vrithin the near futu1,e, the highe s t s tandard of liv i rg 
ever c1reamed of by a ny Greek 'rVould then be attainab l e . The 
i mpor t ance of this is e v ident . I1o l on ger would t he country 
posses s within i t self d is side n t f a c t i ons who sei z e u pon 
the p oor economic plight of the p eo ple as a polit ical wea-
pon . The deve l opment of ne w i ndustr ie s which then would 
provi d e jobs for overpo pulated Gree ce coul d pr o ve t he 
salvation of a nation whi ch was once at the ve rge of an 
economic break down . Th e grim jok e :naking the :r·ounds in 
Gree ce during the height of the f i ghting that, if every 
gueJ:·r il la we r e assured. of a j o b , the guerr illa arm;_~,r iV oulCt 
disappear overn i ght had o uch truth in it . 
I n the field of a gric ultur e, ma ny positive ste :"J s 
were t aken under ERP . As nearly two thirc1.s of t he Gree k 
peo p le received their livelihoo d from the s o i l, the impro ve-
me n t o f a gr icultur al n ethocte 1 a n~ed hi gh on t he li s t of 
"musts" i n the reor·ga n ization of t he Greek e c onomy . 
The limited a mo u nt of lan d a vaila ble f or· tillage 
_pr esente d a p:co bl eu1 for agr i cul t ural experts of' both ill/i.AG 
and ZCA . ~:hroughout t he c ent v.l' i es , nuch la nd had. b " en Dade 
steri l e by defores trat i on , s o il e r os io n , a d flo ot s . The 
a p;al ling f'aet that Greece, lH'i r.la r ily an ag1·icul t1...u·a l 
countr·y , is re crLl il'ed t o i rilpo :d n ear ly one th irc1. of lle l ' 
f oodstuffs prese1 tied <J knott;;,' problen nh i ch h acl t o be so l vecl 
JJio1··e land. had to be mac1e avail a ble :lor cultivation, i t vias 
deci ded. by .Ar:wrican l.·Iis s i o:n ex; erts . With the u s e of' 
hy droe lectric power u p to 2::52,000 hectares of land ca n be 
reclaimed_ from fluoc1s a nd a nothe :c 100 ,00 0 hectares ca n be 
dra ined . This would mean a rise of five per ce nt in the 
nati o na l inc ome of Greece , it \vas estimated. by ECA 
of:ficia ls. 20 
The ECA Mi ss i on has attempted to pro vide leadership 
i n the field of agriculture, leadership which Greek gove1·n-
rnents have la ckecl sLnoe the Ve 11ize los re public . The state 
of Greek agriculture had to be grea tl;y im,JJ.ovecl if a 
tolerable s t a ndard of l iving in the ru:ra l areas was to be 
achieved. The ECA l~is sion envisages the tra nsfer from the 
l and. oi' rnore people to industry as the industrialization of 
Greece proc eeds . This idea , f irst br·ought out in the Food. 
a n d _!\.griculture Re port of' the United Nations , calls fOl' a 
60-40 ratio of industria l wor k ers to farmers, rather tha n 
the o pposite which exists to day • 
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.ti.CA s tresses guidance and t e chn ica 1 ad. vi ce to farrne!'S 
as a prime requisite in proooting agriculture . The primi -
ti ve methods us.ed by t h e bulk of the f arming population 
barely suffices to feed t he farmer ' s famil;y , much 1e2s y ield 
20 Ib" "I _2:_~·' p . DO . 
a surp lus . What is needed , think: EGA off icia ls, is a 
decentralized s Jr stem of government a gri culture cent ers 
where e xpe rts provide the fa rm i ng popula tion with k no wledg e 
i n a c~v a ncecl farmi.ng methods. These c e n ters would be l ocated 
strateg ica lly i n f aru i ng c1 istric ts throughout Gr ee ce and 
wou l d. provi de sel~vices no t u nlilce county: a gricul tura l 
bo ards i n the United St a tes. It should be said at this 
po i nt that technic a l experts of the EGA I1'Ii s sion in Gre e ce 
probably have co nv i nced the Greek pe ople of the s i n cerity 
of the American aid pro gram i n Gree c e more than by any 
other way . .Al t hongh iunerican a dvice at to p Gr eek govern-
me n t a l levels was i mperat i ve , the pos itive effe c ts often 
esca j_J ecl the Gre ek f a r mer or l aborer . But the appearanc e 
of .Americ a n t echn i ca l experts ao.visin g , in this i nst ance, 
t he Gre ek f armer i n t he fielcl, was concrete pr oo f of 
Arn erican determination to better the economic lot of the 
Gree lc jJeople. The organh:.a tion of .PJ.'; AG s pe cifically hacl 
incluaed te ch1.1i ca l expe :c ts who could. go a mong the Greek 
people and of f£!\; construct i ve a d. v ice. The EGA Mi ss i on 
mere l y t ook ove r these f unctio n s a nd continned them. ITo 
l onger was the United S t ates co ntent to g ive eco nomic aid 
to countries and then allovf these government s to use this 
a i d a s it s aw fit • .Arnerican eco nom ic fore i gn policy u nder 
the ERP was to maJ:: e certain that the peop le ::: i n the nations 
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receiving aid were to receive full be nefits of the aid 
ext encle cl . 
The ECA Mis s ion in Greece has tried persua~ing 
Greel;;: farmers to c once ·.1tra te on i i:tonsi ve fann ing vr i th 
emphasis un ca sh cro_±:ls. With com) e t e;nt technical advice 
a nd proper utilization of modern e qui~ment it is hoped that 
Gre ek agri culture output can be increa s ed 40 per cent from 
the 1949 level of 600 millions in dollars. 21 I n referring 
t o Gre ece's agricultural IJaclcaard.nes ;.:: , an .!!..CA repo:r:·t Eays , 
TIThe poss i bilitie s of impr ovement u a;y be se en i n t he fact 
that Greece }_H'odu ces le ss f ood. s tuf'f per r:1a n , per acre , 
ancl pe r ani l11.a l thaE aL o;.:t an;y of the pa r t i cipat i ng c ountr ie 
i n the <)2 -:?" "!~ II ~ ~nr. 
The .American p ro gram for agricul ture ca l ls f or t wo 
i mmediate ob j ec tives . The fir·s t is to -bring mo re land UllQer 
cultivation and. seco ndly , t o rai se the output of the la nd 
a lready be ing tilled . 
By the end of 1952, the ~CA Mi ss i on i n Gree ce hope s 
to bring 580, 000 acres of la nd under control fror1 floo ds , 
. . . - - 23 irr i gate 625,000 acres , and draln 250,000 acresa This 
reclamat i on and. i rrigation of l and wo uld r tl ieve gr eatly 
21 Gre ece -- Country Study , o:p . c it., p . 0 1. 
~ Ibid , p . 31. 
'J r-.r ~° Christian Sc i enc e Vonitor, March 25 , 1949 . 
\ 
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the po9ula tion pres sure on l and . It would a lso se r ve t o 
he lp rese t tle the several hundred thous and refugee s ·who 
were made homeless as a result of the fi ghtiag . The res ter-
a t idn of these people to t heir farm~ and also to r eclaimed 
area ~ is abs olutely es s en tial for the main te nan ce of 
stability . Homeles s r efuge es ea s ily could bec ome d i s -
con t ent ed ancl pre sent an i ncreasi ngl y d ifficult pl1 o'blem. 
The first t vvo ye ars of ERP in Gree ce d id bring about 
a measure of e co nor!l ic stabili t~r . From the st ar t the 
I 
economi c :~ro [ir am wa s gr ea tly hand ica pped by the conti nuance 
of t h e civil war. AL i ndi ca tion of this ca n be se en in t he 
i ndex of Gr eece's li~ited i ndus tri a l pr oduc t i on. In the 
third qua r t er of 19 49, pr oduction wa s still below pr e - war 
l evel. Af te r the termination of the fi ghti ng , t he i nd ex 
r ose a ppro xi maffi ely 33 p er cent in t he first quart e r of 
1 950. 24 
But the real gains under ERP were fairly substant i al, 
cons i dering the h and ic aps the ECA Mis s ion l abored under. 
Ar mecl \•1i th the exper ien ce of .Al'<IAG in the first year of the 
Truman Doc t rine, ECA offi c i a ls d id l a;y the founda t i ons f or 
the improveDe n t of the Gr eelc e co nomy . Under E?.P, there i s 
the first concrete attempt to r eol, ganize Greece's economy 
without utili z i ng arbit rary me a sures. This do es not me an 
24 Tenth Re port to Congres s of EGA, op. ci~., p. 7. 
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to say that EGA officia ls merely suggested measures for 
i mpro vement and idly stood by regardless of whether those 
measures were adopted . Through the threat, used cdnstant ly 
it should be said , of withholding aid funds, ECA f or ced 
Greek gover:nrnen ts to undertak e mea sure s for reform,.'d i s -
tasteful as they may have bee n . 3ut there was a s t nce re 
atte r::1p t by EGA officials to gain an insight i nto Gr eece 's 
pro blems. The realization by ECA that Gre •ce's ef~orts at 
economic recovery had to come from within the frame work 
of the Greek people's work habits wa s i mportant . ~ revo-
lution was being atte~pted in the reorganization of the 
Greek eco :!lomy, with the EGA 1ti s si :J n as the ins tiga tor. 
But this revolution had to be conducted with tact and unc1er-
st and i ng if the bulk of the Gre ek peo ple were to a ppreciate 
fully its fut 'J.re benefits. At the beginiJ.ing of the 3~P 
p:cogram i n Greece , there was much resentme nt on the part 
of the Greeks at •Nhat they co ns idered the tactles sness of 
Americans . One observer of ERP efforts wro te, "The Gree ](s--
rese n t the sometimes intolera :'l.t way in which super i or 
methods are pre ss ed upon them." 25 As the fourth year of 
the American Aid pro gram got underway} a better spirit of 
cooperation had bee n achieved between EGA off icials and 
Greeks . 
25 Chandler, ~· cit. t p . 185. 
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There is li-ttle question that eco nomi c assista n ce to 
GreE ce will be necess~ry beyond the termi nat i on date of 
June DO , 195 (~ . "y t hat time, nearly one and one h~ lf 
billions of dolla 1,s wi ll have be 6n ex pe :n.c ed on Gr ee ce si n ce 
1 945 by -the United ~; ta tes . The pr osiJe ct is that another 
one 11a lf billion vvill be ne E- ded i f the · avowe CL abjective of 
econOE1ic s e l f-sufficiency for G-r eece ever ca n be achieved . 
·:lith mod ern agricultural e quipme n t c:md me thucis and a n in-
t ens ive i ndustria l ex~ansiu n program, ECA official~ believe 
thi s ca ll be d.o ne . For the Un ited States, the attainment of 
t h is obje ct ive woul d be strong proof of the creative ability 
of western socie ty to build a truly better s ociety i n terms 
of eco noo ic pro gress wh ile maintain ing basic political 
fr et doms in the process. 
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Gr ee c e , CO i..lnt r y Da ta Book , op . cit ., ch . 12. 
27 The Tenth Repor t To Congress o f ECn , op . • .1.. ~-, p . 
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28 
Greece, Country Data Bo ok , op . cit ., ch. 9 . 
CHAPTER III 
THE UHIT:i'D li:N:ei OHS AFD GJ.E~CE 
Uni t ed St a tes policy makers well realized the i m-
portance of restoring i nternal security in Greece as a pre-
requisite t o effe ct ing progre s s i n Greece's economic 
progr am. The emphasis on the military ac: pects of t he Truman 
Doctrine showed clea:cly the concern attache d to the Greek 
go vernment's struggle agains t the i nsurgents. I n augme nting 
t his policy, the United St a tes cons t antly chawpio ne d the 
Greek gove rnmen t in both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly of the Unite d Nations. 
Before ana lyzing the attempts of the United na tions 
to bring about peaceful conditions in Greece, the much- de-
bated ques tion of the bypassing of the UN by the Un ited 
States thr ough the Truman Doctrine deserves conside ration. 
Many anxious observers contended that the unilate ra l action 
by the United. States dealt the i nternational body a severe 
blow i n pres tige . Admi nistrat i on officials did no t agree. 
In launching the a id pro gr an to Gr eece, President 
Truman referred onl y briefly to the United Nations, say i ng 
that it was unable to offer as s istance i n what the pres ident 
considered a situation nre quiri ng imme di at e a ction . '' 1 
1 Reco~nendations On Aid To Greece and Turkey, 
~. cit., p. l 
This disbelief in the UN's ability to cope with the 
emergency in Greece was later elaborated upon by Ac ting 
Secreta r y of State Dean Acheson. In a prepared statement 
delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
the secretary said, 
11 If Greece had applied to the United :Nations or any 
of its related organizations, the essential element 
of time would have ge en lost and the end result would 
have been the same. The funds would have to come 
primR rily fro m the United States. 
· •. L .Even if the project were not blocked by the ob-
jections of certain members of the United Nations, 
much time would. have been lo st , and time is of the 
essence. 2 
Instead of weake ning the UN, Acheson maintained the United 
States would strengthen that body by givi ng 11 the gl'eatest 
6 
encoura gement to other E1embe1's •••• in that we vvould •••• foster 
eco nomic, social, and political co :ndi tions •••• esse ntial for 
the nain tenance of the independence of Greece ••.• 11 3 
Despite the firm conte ntion by the Administration 
that the UN was not equipped to handle the aid pro gram, dis-
s at isfaction with the Administration's seeming disregard 
for the UN provo ked much crit icism. Congressio nal leaders 
t ook heed. of this apparent disapproval by the .American 
people, and i nserted in the Act, exte ndi ng aid to Greece, 
2 iQuestions anc1 Answers Relating to the Greeo;:;Turkish 
Aid Bi ll. 
3 Department of St a te Bulletin (Suppleme nt), May 
4, 1947. pp. 866-867: 
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a provisio n which d irected the Presiden t to withd raw aid, 
If the Security Council fi nds {with res pe ct to which 
fi nd i ng the Un ited St ates waives the exe r ci s e of a ny 
v e to) or the General As sembly finds that action tak:e n 
or a s s istan ce furn i shed by the Unite d na tions rnakes 
the con tinua n ce of such as s ist a:r1c e u nnece::::sa rv or 
u nde sirable. 4 u 
It should. be noted. that the insertion of thi s clause 
was no t ins pi r ed by the Admi n istration but by Se nator 
Vandenb e r g of the political o :pposi tio n . The clam; e be came 
known a s t he Va nd E: :nb erg Amendment . The situation n eve1· did 
arise when. the UH could be e n trus t ed to ha ndle the eco r10 ~·,1 ic 
pr og ram by the Un ite d S t a tes. Howe ver, the above .Ame ndme : t , 
d i d help quell L uch of the c1, i ticism leve lle d at t h e Admi n-
is t :r: a t i on . 
The Admi nistrat io n defin itel;y- was motivated by the 
fear o f Soviet Union obstruc tion , if the a i d pro graL han 
l'JeE:n presen ted t o the UN for cons idera t i on . An o the r corn-
plica ting facto r , which the Administration undoubtedl y took 
i n to c on s i de r ation , wae tha t if the Eco norJ ic and Social 
Counc il of the Ge ner a l As ~ embly h andled the econdn:lic pr o g ram , 
its powers wou l [ only have bee n advisory a nd would be h and-
ica p1J e d i n enfor·cin g an effective eco:r.1omic pro c ram fo1· 
Greece. As will be d iscuss ed in the ne x t cha p ter of this 
stucly , the Admi nj_stration wa s deterwi ned to wield its i n -
fluence in mak i ng certain tha t aid funds would be utilized 
4 An Act to Provi d e For Assist anc e to Greec e a 1.1.d 
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const1•uctively by the G-reek government. But as events 
proved , actual a i d under the Doctrine did not re s ch the 
Greek peo ple for at lea s t five months aft er the President ' s 
speech. The time limit, therefore , stres sed by the Admin-
is tratio n did no t becooe the all -important facto r for ex-
tending as s istance to Greece. The c onc lusion is that a mor·e 
construct ive approach re ga rding the Unitecl Nat ions coulc_ 
have been used by the Administration , if only to obtain 
General Assembl y approval of the Truman Doctrine before its 
i mplementation. 
The preble . of Greece secur i ty had concerned the U.rJ 
we ll ove1~ a year befo1·e the inaugur at io n of the Truman 
Doctrine. The Greek question was discus s ed for the £ irst 
ti u1 e on January 21, 1946, in the Secur·ity Council, fol lowing 
a charge by Soviet Union Delegate that the presence of 
British tl' Oops in Greece rep1•esent ed a threat to i nterna t i ona 
peace and security . 5 The majority of the con:ncil men1be rs d.id 
not agree with the Soviet thesis and United States De le gate 
Stettinius offe :cE:d a compromise vv-h i ch d.eclared that the 
Council wo uld take no te of the Soviet charge but would 
co nsider the Datter closed . This propo s a l was adopted on 
Feb.;rual~;'l 6 , 1 946. The second discussion of Gree ce in the 
5 The United Nations and the Problem of Greece , 
Departmen~of-st~, Pub. 2909, Near ~~stern Series 9, 
S e pte m be r· , 19 4 7 , p • l • 
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Se cur i t ;y Council began on August 28 , 1946, \-.rhen the Soviet 
Unio n , throt"!..gh the U1cranian de le gate , accused the Greek 
government of produc ing a situation endangering peace in the 
Balkans . After n early four weeks of d i scuss i on the Security 
Council declined to acce ~t the Soviet conte n tion once aga i n . 6 
These charges by the Sovi et Un i on were obvious attempts to 
discredit the i3ri tish-sponsored Greek gover:r.ne i:.t which 
d i sp layed an openly hostile, a n ti-Rus s ia n at t itude. 
Throughout the fall of 1946, increasing guerrilla 
warf ar e resul te et i n a steady we ak e n i ng <llf t he Greek army . 
It was ge nerally known t o mos t obs ervers of the Balkan scene 
that Greek i nE: u rgents were receiv i ng as:..:istance from Greece's 
no rt hern neighbors . With United St ates support , the Greek 
gove:cm.u.ent , on Dece mber 3 , 1946 , re quested t h e Security 
Cou~lCi l to consider a si t u a tion which, the Greek government 
chargec1 , wa s le a d i ng to fri ct i on bet·vvee n Greece anc1 her 
nor t hern neigh bo r s . 7 The comp l a i n t by Greece r1as made 
unC.e:c A-rt i c le 34 of the Charter which stated that the 
Security Council "may i nves tigate a ny dispute , o r any sit-
uatio n , vvhich mi ght lead to i n ternat i onal friction ••.• 11 
On Dece mber 6, 1946, the Security Council una n i mously 
6 La c . cit. 
7 Greece and the United Nations, 194 6- 49 , De par~ en t 
of State , PUb. -3645 , I n t. Orgcn:J.-:-;-a nd Coril"": Ser;-ies III , 
October , 1 949 . p . 1. 
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appro ved. a resolution establi shi ng a Corrnili ss i on of Invest -
i gat io n to lo ok into the charges made by Greece . This re-
solution dire c ted. (1) the Commission of Inve stigation to 
ascel'tain the i'a c ts re lating to the al l eged. border vio l a -
t i ons between Gre e de on the one ha nd, and Alba nia , Bul garia 
a nd Yugosla via on t he other ; (2) the COL.'lrnission to oe co;·J -
posed of repre s enta tives from each ot' the Security Counci l 
members a .Yl CL llB l E o j:l. re presentat i-,.res :from t he fo ur part ies 
to t he" di spute ; (3) the Commi ssion to submit a report of 
the facts d. isclo sed. by the i nvestiga tion ; and (4 ) the 
Commi s sion to ca ll upon the goverrm.1e:nts i nvo lved. i n the 
d ispute for informat i on . 8 Hi th he a dquarters in Sa l oni ka , 
Greece , the Corru:.1issi<im be ga n its i nvestigations in the 
:fol l owing month . 
After ne arly foul~ months of inve stiGations ancl 113 
meet i ngs , the Corrunittee of I nvest i gat i on s ubmitted a 767 
pa g e re,l_Jort of its fincl i~::O t o the Security Counc il on 
May 27 , 1947. rrhe Report was thoroughly d.ocur.o.ente d. a nd. 
inchul ed statements from 256 vJ i t :Gesses , i r:w l ucting 21at i ona ls 
f'rom a ll four countr i es i n•., olvecl in the di s1;ute . 'fhe Comr.!lis 
sian entered. all four countries in carrying out its i nvesti -
, . 9 g a lJ ~o n . 
8 United Nations DoCUD.1ent S/ 339 , May 2 , 1947 . 
9 Report of the Commi ss io n of I nv es tiiga t ion c ._,nc e r n 
Greek Frontie r Inoiaents , UN Docume nt S/ 360, :Dtay 27 , 1 947 . 
7 
The conclusions of the GoElrn i s sion merely confirmed 
what was generally known-- Greek Guerrillas were receivi ng 
assistanc e from the three countries of the north . The 
Commission also found evide n ce that Yugoslavia and Bulg a r ia 
received a nd actively spon sored separatist mo vemen ts BElong 
Greek Slavs in Greek 11a ced.onia which adjoi ned the t wo 
cou_n tries. The Commission stressed that this was no t 
co nnected with the guerrilla fi ghting . The Coiilmission 
further concluded that there rrwas evidence of strained re-
l a tions between the countries" and that much of the u nre s t 
in Greec e was cau::::ecl by the KJCE (Greek Communist Party) . 10 
To alleviate and correct these d isrupting factors, 
the Gom..rnission offered. r ecommendations . Greece a l1d her 
northern ne ighbors shoul d. establish diploma t ic relations, 
the ComrniEsion stated , and the four part ies should ref'r·ain 
fro m creating bo1·der incide n t::::. Al ba nia, Bul gar·ia, and 
Yugoslavia should. cea s e supporting Greek guerrilla s , the 
Re po rt empha s izing that continua nce of support would be a 
thr eat to the peace . The four governme nts should enter • .L l Ti vO 
a conve ntion, the Report urged. , to settle ctiffe.:ce nces. Th e 
:fina l re co rnr11e nda t ion c a l l ed for the creation of a permanent 
UN Commi s sion in the BalJcans which would co ntinue the i n -
vestigat ion of border i ncidents . 11 
--ro--rold. p. 177 0 
11 
• 249-251. 
As the fi ncLings of thi s Commis s ion of' Inve s ti gation 
were in line with .Ar.ileri can poli cy in Gr e6 ce, United. States 
S ecurit~! Council Delgate Austin i n troduced. a re so lut i on 
adopting the substance of the Commi ssion ' s Repol't .12 As 
was expected. , the Soviet Union vetoed. the resolution o:a. 
July 29 , 1947, declining to accept either the c onc lusions 
or the r'e commenclations of the Commiss i on 's Repo1· t. Accept-
anc e of the Repo r t by the Sovi et Uni un wou ld have refuted 
her charges that the troub l ed s i tuat i on along Greece's 
northern :fro nt iers was due solely to t h e misdeeds perper-
tx· ated. b;y the Greelc governme nt. The Soviet Union c1e le tsa te 
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utilized. the veto f ou r other times during the su:mrner of 194,7 
i n :preve::.1ting the Securi t~r Council from taki ng a ny action 
a l ong the l i nes recommended. i n the Conu"ll i ssion of Investi-
gation ' s Report . 1 3 In the face of Sovi et Union i:ntran-
sigence , the Greek question , on the motion of the United 
states d.ele gate , was take n off the Sec urity Cou nnil agenda, 
on Se ptember 15, 194'7 . Previ ous to this , on Augus t 20, 1947 
The Uni ted States de l egate t o the General Assembl y ha<1 re -
quested. cons i deration of "threats to the ~olitical Indepe n -
dence and Terri tol' ial I ntegrity of Gree ce, rr by that b od.y •1 4 
1 2 United. Nations Document S/ P.J . 14'7. 
13 Greece and. the United. Nations, 19L.b6-49' op .cit.,p. 
1 L1 United 1\Tations Docume nt, A/ 3 4 4 , August 21, 19L_b7 0 
• 
7 
It was clear tha-t the United :S t a tes policy was de ter;·;lined 
to use every po ss ible means in the UN to restore peace i n 
the Ba l lcans. This policy fne re ly augr.1ented. the objective of 
ma i n taining a fr iend.l~r, pro-United Sta t es gov ernme n t i n 
strateg ic Greece, now that the Uni ted States was ir:t.'evocably 
bound by commi ttme n ts un d.er the Truman Doctr·i ne. 
The General Ass embly on Se p ternoer 23 , 19 47, ad.opting 
a resolution by the United St at es, decid.ed. to i nclude the 
Gree k que st ion on the agend.a. The re s olution c a lled for 
adoption by the Assembly of pra c tically all of the Commi-
s s i on of I nv estigat io n 's Report . 1 5 Within a month, the 
Assembly approved., by a 40-6 vote with eleven abstentions, 
a re s olution whi ch was in substa :ace the same offel~ed by the 
Un ite d St a tes. The resolut ion called u pon Alba n ia, Bul garia 
and. Yugoslavia to stop givi r g aid to Greek guen·illa s and 
ur~ed. them to establis h good relations with Greece . The 
Assembly fur ther req_ue sted tha t the four nations coo perate 
in the .1a tt e r of :r e f ugees; est a blish frontier conventions 
for s ettling bo rder d is putes ; and facilitate the tra nsfer of 
peaceful minorities in the Balkans . Also, the Assembly in 
its resolution created the Unite d natio n s Specia l Com;. iittee 
15 United Eations Docmnent, A/c. 1.}191, September 
25, 1947' pp. 1-2. 
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on the Ba l kans , to be composed of r eprese n t at ive s f rom 
eleve n nati ons , a nd endowed i t with powe .r·s of observation 
and COl1C iliat i on .l6 This s pecia l cornmit t e e , comraonl y re -
fe r-' ed to as UNS COB , became the pr i L1e souree of i nf'ormat i o n 
for the UN co ncern i ng fricti on in the Ba l kans . It sh011l d 
be noted that the Soviet Uni on and. Po l and , thou gh appointe d 
members by the Assembly , refused to a l low its de le gates to 
sit in on UNS ~OB . 
UNSCOB ' s t asks were prima rily t o as s is t the four 
Balkan countr ies in a t tain i ng the above ob j ective s of the 
Ge nera l Ass eLbly ' s re solut i on o f October 21, 1947 . I n a 
supp le me::.1t ar~r report to the Asse.,,bly deli verd. i n the fall 
of 1948 , UITSCOB stated that Al bar i a , .2ulgaria , and Yugoslavi a 
refuse d to cooperate with t he co~~ittee . The se three 
c ountr ies, UHSCOB repo rte d , re fused to comp l y with the 
Asse mbly res ol ut i on cal ling for ces s at i on of a i d to Greek 
guerr illas .l7 '~h e s e guerrillas Hhave be en l ar ge l y de pend-
ent on exte r na l su:pp l y , •••. t hus have beeE ab l e to c onc an-
t r a t e their fo l'c e s without i nterference by the Gre e k army , 
and to r eturn to Gre e ce v.; e n they wishe d . " l s 'ifhe n the 
1 6 United 1Jat i ons Docume nt, A/409 , Octobe r 24 , 1 947, 
PP • 5-7 . 
17 Su pp lemen t a ry Report of U1~SCOB , UJ'J Do cu ne nt A/644 , 
Se p te mbe r ll, 1948 , p . 19 , pa r . 6 ~ . 
lH Jbid, p . 19, pa r . 63 . 
GreE;k Army exe:ctecl pres sur e , the insurgents the n retrea ted 
saf'el;y into the terri tory of Alba nia, :Julga:cia , a n c1 
Yugoslavia , U3SCOB revealed. I n order to correct this , 
UNSCOB urge d the Asse u bly to i s s ue a sevel"e -v.ra:cn i n g to 
Alba n ia, Bulgaria ~:md Yu gos l nvia dec laring that continuecl 
ai d e nda ngere d peac e i n the Ba l kans .l9 
The General Asse mbly , after a pro l onged discus Ei on , 
a gain ad p t ed a res o l ut i on , by a 47 - 6 vote, on Nove mber 
27 , 1948 , which took note of UESCUB ' s co n clusions a nd re-
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co mEle Eda t i ons . The resolution also continued the existe n ce 
of UES COB for a j_~other ~r ear •20 
Further efforts to r estore peace i n the 3a l ka ns were 
u nd e11 t aken by the UH . In the f a ll of 1948 , the First 
Comli1 i t te e (Politic a l and Security) of the Ge n eral Asse r.:1bly 
establi s hed a Conciliation Corm,li ttee compo s e d. of the Pre -
sident of the Genera l As s embly, the Secretary - Ge nera l, and 
the Chairman a nd Vice-Cha i n an of the Fil'St Comn ittee. This 
body concern ed its elf with exploring the pos s ibilities of 
reaching a pac ific settlemen t of d i ff eren ces betwee n Gre e ce 
1 9 Ibid, p . 20 ., Par·. 69 . 
20 Greece and the UN, 1946, o p . c it., p. 3 . 
d h th · hbor~ 2 1 an er no r ern nelg ~ . On e per plexing problem v;hi ch 
t he Conciliation Co mmittee de alt with was Greece ' s i nsis -
tence that northe rn Ep irus, which was par t of southern 
.Alban ia, be given to Greece . Su ccessive Greek govel~ Ill1e nts 
consis tently claimed t h is territory as r ightfully belonging 
t o Gree ce , althou gh Gre el;:s we r e in the mi nOI'i ty of the 
po pulat i on . The Alba n ian govern:nent i n turn refused to 
sign a ny agreeme n t establishing fr•ontier COu1Inissions , as 
a d.vo catec1 by the Conciliation Comrn i ttee , u nless the Gree k 
Govel'nme n t renoun ced it s claims to northen Epi:cus . 22 It 
shoul d be no t ed at this po i n t that the United States , al-
though upholcUng Gre e ce ' s position i n t he U:N in mo8t every 
other vvay , refused to SU]port Greece ' s claim to this 
terri tory. The Uni ted St ates ha s never offic ial l y comme n ted 
on t his but the real rea s on for her no n- support of Gre ece's 
claim is probably that ce s sion to Greece of t h is terr i tory 
would d im any pros pects for establishing a la s ting pea c e in 
the .Balkans . Af:. it was , the Conci l iation Comm i ttee was no t 
too successful in l ay i ng the foundat i ons f or a peaceful 
21 Greek Glue s ti o:n i n the Fourth General Assemblv of 
the UN, Department of St ate , Pub . 37 85 , I nt . Org . a n d Go:ni'er . 
Series I II , April, 1950 , p; l ~ 
22 Gre e ce and the Ul\T , o p . cit • , p • o. 
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settleme nt i n the Balkans, parti cularly between Albania and. 
Bul garian on one ha nd., a nd Greece on the other. However, 
the at t itude of Yugoslavia had u ndergone a noticeab l e change 
in rega rd to her relstions with Greece. In answer to ten-
tative sucgestions propo s ed by the Conciliation Com.rn ittee 
l"egarding the resumption of di pl omat ic rela·tions with 
Greece, the Yu goslav gove r nrile :nt submitte d a p:co :posal which 
said, "Yugoslavia ancl Greece dec l a1·e themsel·ves rea dy to 
ta J.-;: e up quest i ons at i ssue betwee n them thru regular d i p -
l omat ic channels.!! 23 The Yugoslav delegat i on wa s quick 
to qualify this sta tern.e n t by infer·ring that a general overal 
s ettleraen t of the Balkan problem -v a E ne ed.ec1. , not an uni-
lateral one with Greece. Nev ertheles s , in comparison with 
the negative a pp roaches d is playecl ·by Alba n ia a nd Dulgar·ia, 
the Yugoslav attitude raised hopes that a Balkan sett l er!l en t 
could be effecte d . 
In connection Vli th Yugoslavia's increasir;.g ly co nc il-
iatory atti tu.d.e , the existence of UNSCOB i n the .Ba l k a n E c ame 
to :play a n important role . I;1arshall Ti to's breal~ with the 
RuEsi an-d.omi nated Cominform i n 1948, wa s welcomed by the 
west . Many ske ptics remained, ho wever, who d.iStl'us ted. the 
23 Report of the Concil,i a tion Corn.tu i ttee , UE :Docmt1ent 
A/e! .l/506 , October 22 , 1949, ..IU1ne x 6, pal.' . 1. 
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sincerity of Tito 's de fia nce of the Cominform . Actions, 
not just til'ad.es a gain st the Cominform, would prove mo :re 
convinc i ng , ske ptics felt. The 1949 re port of UNSCOB to 
the General Assembly contained factual evidence of ste ps 
taken by Yugoslavia against the Cominform. 
In sunn~narizing eve nts which tr~ms pired betvveen its 
periodic re ports to the Assembly, UNSCOB noted a change in 
the Balkan situation . On July 6, 1949, UNSCOB repo rted that 
Greek guerrilla radio station , 11 Free Gre E:! ce, n ac cused 
Yugoslavia of permitting Greek government troops to cross 
Yugos lav ter r·i tory i n operations against the Greelc i nsur·gents 
On the follo wing day , the "Free Greece" radio declared that 
Yugoslavia had ambitions of annexing T1 Aegean1' Macedonia to 
Yugoslav i a . On July 10, 1 949 , Ea rshall T ito, in rebuttal, 
s a id that this fltreacher;y" on the part of Greek guerrillas 
would injure their cause. At the same time Tito ordered the 
Greek-Yugoslav fro nt ier c losed . 24 
The quarr el between Greek guerrilla chieftains and 
Ti to weakened the plight of the insurgents . U:NSCOB noted 
n 
that ·matei"ia l as s istance fro m Yugoslavia to the Greek 
guerrillas had diminished.- 11 25 
24 Text of Report of UNSCOB , Genel.'al As se;nbly Of f i ci 
Records: Fourth Ses sion, Su pp l ement No. 8 , A/935, 1 9£.1:9 , 
Par . 104. 
25 
Ibid, par . 107 . 
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The UHSCOB Report a l so declared that nAlbnnia a nd. :aul garia 
have continued to give mora l and mate rial a ssistanc e to t h e 
Greek guer r illa mo ve men t . Albania is the principal source 
of material assistance . " 26 
Des pite inc r ea s ed as s i sta 11ce .::'rom Alban ia and ·.:;ulga ria 
the cause of t he Gree1c gue :cr i llas be c ame hopeless . The 
increasing eff ectivene s s of the Greek army , reo:cga ~1ized under 
.A.'nerican Military His r::ion s upervi s ion , and t he vvi thd.rawal of 
suppo::ct by Yugoslavia virtually extinguished the Gr eek 
rebel mo vement in Gree ce . Within a fe w mon ths after ':Pi to r s 
declaration of non- suppor t for the i nsurge nts, t he Greek 
Army Vias a ble to c l ea :c the vast part of Gree ce of Co r.m:m nis t -
l ed gue l,I'illas . .Although t he UH obviousl3r could. not ta~ce 
t h e full share of credit f o r ending the Gr eek civil wa r , 
its contributions v1ere sign i f icant . The se nd i ng of inve st -
igatil~ bod ies to Gr ee ce by both the Secur ity counci l and 
t he General As sembl y disclosed the real nature of friction 
in the Balkans, v,rhi ch wa s the des ire to overthrow t he Greek 
government by the Cominfor m. The fre qu ent , thorou ghly-docu-
mented r eports of UN investigating bo d ies il-1 Greece gave a t 
picture of the s truggle wh i c h was the attempt by the Soviet 
UniQn , through her satellites, to domin8 t e the Greek penin-
sula a nd conseque ntly the '<Vh ole near .c!Jas t . 
------ ---
26 Ib. -~' par . 13 9. 
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Up to now , this studs has be f:n concernec. wi t h UlJ 
efforts to terminate the civil war . Conse quent ly, €3 phasis 
nec essari l y was pl ac ect on the mi li tary aspe cts of the Greek 
que s tion . 3ut the U:N , through its specialized a ge ncies, 
has contributed much to Gre ece ' s efforts at economic re-
covery ancl development. This contribut i on has co YJ.sis t ed. 
mainl ;:.; in conclucting studies a:nd off ering recomnw n dations 
for so cial and econoo ic i mprovements . 
3y f ar t he mo st impo1·tant study undertake n under UH 
supervision v7a s the Food and Agriculture Repor t mad.e in 
1946 . This Mi ssion was headed by an .At'Tler ican Agl~icul tura l 
expe rt, FranJcl i n S . Ha1•ris , and. posses :s ed a n i n terna.tional 
st5ff . The FAO Mi ssion made an exhaustive survey , spend i ng 
most of the time in the field i n vis iting a ll ma jo r areas 
of Gre ece and in conferring wi th all econo hliC groupings of 
the Greek popula t ion .27 
The FAO l\ili ssion 's most v a lua bl e contributions are 
the recommendat ions fo r long-range :.·. de v e l opmen t of the 
Greek economy . I n the field. of agriculture , FAO stressed 
the nee d for de v e l opment of Gree ce 's water resourc es . The 
po tentia lities of the. contro l of v~ater , FAO said, 11will 
27 Report of the FAO Mis s i on For Gr·eece, Fo od and 
Agriculture Or·gar~ization of the Uni t ed Nations , March--
19 47' p. 3 • - -- ----
contribute more wealth to the nation , and as s ist far mo re 
i n raising the standard of l iving of millions of people in 
28 Greece , than any other natural- resource development . n 
FAO recommended that these wa t er projects for irnigat ion , 
drainage , f l ood control , and hydroelec t ric power develop-
ment be financed by granting of long- term , low- i nterest 
loans guaranteed by both the UN and the Greelc go vernment . 
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Nearly 50 water deve l opment pl'ojects throughout Gr eece He r e 
l isted by FAO as certain to be nefit the Greek eco nomy . 29 
In advocating hydroelectric plants as ne cessary for i ndus -
trial deve l opment , the thorough F.AO Report undoubted l y 
provided the ba s is for the hydroelectric development program 
later initiated by the ECA Mi ssion . 
FAO recOL.'111lended that agriculture and consumer co -
operatives be encoura ged to play a prominent part . .Assis-
tanc e to these co - operatives could come from the Agricul ture 
Bailie of Greece throu gh lending at lovl i n terest rates/50 
FAO suggested . 
F.AO was well avmre that social and economic reforms 
were necessary and advocated tax refonns along •aith reform 
of the civil service . Interna.l taxe s , FAO urgec1 , should.. be 
28 Ibid , p . 14 . 
29 I bid , p . 19 . 
30 Ibid., 47. p. 
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abolished in fac ili tat ing the deve lopme n t of i nterna l 
tra de . Taxatio n of those most able to pay was recom:!!ended 
with a corres pondi n g re duc ti0n in e xcise t a xe s . This l a ter 
be c a o e a definite objective i n Un i t ed State ' s p l an E for 
so c i a l p ro g res s i n '7. 1 Greece. 0 
FAO f urther reco:mmEn-: ded tha t a permanent Ur iA.dvisory 
i.-ii s Eion 1Je established in Greece whi ch \7oul d. replace all 
other i n te rnationa l a nd fo~eign economic mi s s i ons . This U~ 
dvis o :ry I.as s i o!l ~wuld a i d a nd adv ise t he Gre ek go ve · r.uaent 
by npr ovid i :::J.g te c h n ic a l ai d a nd ass i s ta nce in car1'31ing out 
t h e general de velopme n t prog1·am i'or Greece , de velop s pec i f i c 
pr ogr ams and act i ons to put into e ffect the reforms of 
ta x at i on and o=· the civil se r vi c e • 1132 Th is :vropo sed mi s sion 
at first gla nce was not unliJce Al.iAG and EGA l.Iis s io n s . But 
the siin i l a r ity ended nhen FAO f a iled to suggest a ny 1.1ea :ns of 
en forci n g t · e progl'am of reform if the Greek bovernr.'wn t 
v;as to baDe at i mpler:J e n ting t e sugge sted measm.•e s . 
One very impo r t a n t obs e r vation made by FAO that de -
s erves at t e n tion concerned the re l at i 0nsh i p be t wee n the 
c e n tral a nd lo cn l g ov e r nme n t . The FAC _ eport s c:1y s : 
.An improved standnrd o f living can be obtaine d 
sue ce ss fully onl y throu gh the e d.u ea tion of t he i ndi vi ell a 
so that he learns to rely on h i mse lf •••• 
3 1 Ibid , p . 57 . 
32 Ibid, pp . 60- 61 
Se curing the prope r balance between governme ntal 
leadership and local fre edom for i nit iative and action 
ca n be helped by emphas izing delegation of authority 
and de centra~zation of res pons ibility i n goverr~ent 
activities • •• .:;" 
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Decentra :[; · zation of authol,ity in Greece, urged by FAO, was 
embodied in the general plans for reform advocated. by later 
.Ame:r•ican Missions . 
For the United States the 188 page FAO Re port on 
Gre e ce _provided American eco nomic _planners w·i th an excellent 
guide in promo ting economic recovery in Gre e ce. The basic 
recomE1end.ations of FAO were di gested by 1\n1erican lHis s ion 
' 
officials and formed an inte gra l part of the ec onomic aid 
.Pl'Og:rarn . 
Official achnowledgement by the United Sta tes of the 
FAO Report wa s frequent . In the mids t of charges that the 
United States had forsaken the UN under the Truman Do ctrine, 
Adminis trat i on leaders were quick to stress that FAO re-
cornr.,1ended an i nitial interna tional lean to the Greelc go vern-
ment as a start in carrying out the Greek econornic pro gram . 3 
As the Report was publishe d approximately the same time as 
the Doctrine was being discussed in Congress, Admi nistration 
l eaders inserted a reference to FAO in the preaml)le of the 
Act, providing aid to Greece . The reference in part read; 
33 Ibid , 4 . p . 
34 Ibid, 61. p . 
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'iihereas the Food. and .Agricnl ture Organi zation 
miss io n for Greece recognized the nece ssi ty that 
Greece receive financial and eco nomic assistanc e 
and recorn:nended that Greece request such as s i stanc e 
i'rom ••• the govern2e nts of the United St ateE ancl the 
United Kingdom ••• 5 
Other UN specialized agencies also contr ibuted i m-
porta n t stud ies and actua l s ervi ces to Greece 's eff orts i n 
eco nomic reha bilitation . Although most Ul'T agencies la cJced 
t he fu11d.s to i mp l emen t their re comnemla tions , the 'il-orl d_ 
Hea l th Organi zation was able t o establish a chest ho spi t a l 
and sanitoria f or treatment of tuberculo sis ca s es 3 i n Greece . 
Further services for imp:.:· ovement of Greece's social con-
dit ions are avowed obje ctives of the UIT 's Econoo ic and 
Socia l Counci l v1 hen funds beco;-"1e avai l able. 
Another important s tudy concerning Gre ece's la bor 
movemen t was made by another UN agency , the Internationa l 
Labor Offic e . I n a 381 page re port , ILO found. that much 
coul d be done by the Gre ek governmen t to better the status 
of Greek workers and their unions . The mo st import ant 
re corn..ue nd.a tions we 1·e ; ( 1) emplo ;yrae ~-:.t plann i ng by tripartite 
coo pe rat i on of employers, l abor un i ons , and the Greek 
go vernment; (2) planned emigrat i on of wo r :-e r s i n ove rcro \'Jd.ec1 
trades ; (3} orga nization of an effe ctive ins pect i on system 
r/. 5 
i) An Act to ? rovid e For Assista nce to Greece anct 
Turkey, op . cit . 
36 The United Nat i~ns Year Book, 1947-4 8 , p . 91 4 . 
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for enforcing so c ial legislation ; (4) an improve d social 
i nsurance sys tem for sicknes s b elle fi ts and reorganization of 
the pension systeu; and (5) Greek tra de un ions should be 
g iven :po litica l independence by the Greek government a nd 
sho u l d not be unduly discrimi na t et aga inst. 3 7 Thes e re-
conr::nenclations by ILU clid influence .Aruer ican :dssion officials 
vvho a pp lied pressure on Greek gove rnme nts to ea s e res t :ci c-
tions on la~o r uni ons . An example of this occurred in the 
winter of 1947-48. In October , 1947, t he Greek Parliament 
enacte d a law prohibiting any str i kes by un io ns . This 
create d Il1UCh consternati0n i n labor c ircles and l eaders of 
the CIO and AFL in the United Sta tes pro tested the action of 
the Greek gove rnrnent. Af ter co ns ul ts tion with t he Gre eJc 
gover:r::rruent, the American Tvi ission a mwunced that the law 
wou l d be repeale d , and it was . 38 
The policy of the United States in regard to the 
problem of Greece has foll owed consistently the patterns 
set out under the Trmo.an Doc t r ine. The es ta lJli shment of 
peaceful i nterna l conditions i n Greece was a paramount 
'7. 7 0 Report of the Liission of the ILO to Gre e ce,ttLabor 
Prob lems in Gret:ce 11 , International Labor Office, Geneva, 
l949, pp.~94-323. 
38 The De partment of St ate Bulletin , Vol. :=VIII, 
No. 453, l'iarch 7, 19 48 . 
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objective no t onl y a2 a pre -re qui site for reco nstruc ting 
the Greece economy but in redu ci ng the dangero us f ric t i on 
engendered by the enmity betwe e n Gre e c e and her northe:rn 
neighbors . The United State s , thou gh c onstan tly u pho l d i ::J.g 
Greece , was somev1hat cau tious in s u pporJGi ng UN activ ities in 
the Ba l kans . The Adrni n ist ra ·G i o:n never wa s will i ng t o tak e 
the ri sJ.;: of furthe r comp licat i ons by pre s sing for ret a lia-
to :r·y act i on a gainst the Comi nf'orTi1 governrnents so obviou s l y . 
i n te n t on overthrowing the Gree~LC gov er:rrrne nt. Fur ther evi d-
e nce of United S t ates s u pport of the status quo in the 
Ba l kans wa s the unw i ll i ngness t o back Greece's clair:J. for 
a dd itiona l terr i t o ry in Alba nia. The UH thus served Uni ted. 
S t a t es Ba l kan policy well. By ta ~c ing the le a cl i n s upJJo rting 
Greece ' s caus e the United Sta tes was ab l e t o co nvince ma:."ly 
UN me nb ers, lJarticularly t he s r.1al l er natio ns, of the ab-
solute neces s ity for pushing back the i mper i a list expansion 
of the Soviet Uni on . It is significant to no te tha t Arab 
natio ns , as a bloc , voted affi.rEta tive l y f or almo s t e very 
reso l ution s ponsored by the Uni t e d States, g iving added 
evidenc e of the ir r eal i zat i on of the danger which woul d 
confront them if Greece were t o fa ll. 
By f ocusi ng worl d- wi de atte n tion on the Greek proble m, 
the UN was abl e t o bring t o the surface f or exposu:ce t h e 
r e al threat to ,Pea ce i n the Balk a ns . Without t h e e x istance 
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of UN inve s tigat i ng Commi ssions in the field, Cominform 
countri es co ~1ce iva bly coulcl have be en tempted. t o send.ITvo 1-
nnt ee rs , IT in re ali t y their ovn troops , into Gree ce t o as s ist 
t heir bre thre n , particularly i n early 1947 when the Gre elc 
government was very y.realc. A quick over ~throw of the Greek 
gover1Eent could the n have been presented. as a f a it a ccompli. 
But the pres ence of the I nve s tiga ting Commi s sion and its 
succes so r, UHS COB, on the scene YJO uld have , ade such a ve n-
t ur·e to o risky to undert ake. 
· The activities of the UN were i mportant steps in the 
restora t ion of interna l security in Gre ece. By its d is-
closu:ce of the f a cts anct discus sing them, hazy misco ncep-
tions about the civil wa r, such a s the 11 de r:10 cra tic 11 . na ture 
of the guerrila mov emen t, were co nsidered in their true pe~s­
pective s . With U1JS GOB still functioning today, a consta nt 
vi g ilance on Greece ' s norther n neighbo:cs go es on, reassur i ng 
the Greek people, absorbed i n the diffuclt tasks of re-
habilitating t heir econowy, of the support the free world 
is determi ned to e x te nd to them. 
CHAPTER IV 
POLI TICAL Al\fD S OC IAL F2FORMS I H GH71,"'CJ: 
.An asses sme nt of reality macle it imperative that 
socia l and eeonomic r eforms be undertak e !! i n Gr eece if the 
objectives of the Am.e rican a id pro g1'at..1 were ever to be 
a chieve d . The deficiencies inherent i n Greece' s political 
and eco nomic structure l ong had been deterre nt fac t ors i n 
Greece 's pitiful l y slow ~re gre s s towards the goa l of a 
be tter life for the country ' s 7, 8 00,000 i nhab i tants • .AI. er-
ica n econowic planners were keenl;,r aware of the discre pancies 
in Greece ' :=:: soci3l and economic life. The feeling ·was that 
an ezte nsive reorganization of Greece ' s social structure 
had to be accor.Jpli s hed if Gre E.;ce was to progre s s f orwal'd • 
.As alrea dy me:r1ti o:ned , .Admi n istratio n off icials 
s pecifica l ly wa n ted as s urances fror~l t he Gree k gover n.inent 
that the Ame rica n hi:ission, i.e • .A:.lAG , would be rela tively 
free f rorJ. i n t erfere n ce by the Gr e ek government t o adu i n ister 
the aid. lJ l'O g l'B!Jl . Ju~ ticle IV of the ag:r•ee me nt signe d. by the 
United Sta t es a nd Greece in June , 1947, s pecifically 
stated that , 
The Chief of the .American l:.'I i ss i on will deterr.uine, 
in consultation Vif i th re pl'es ent a-cives of the Gove1mnent 
of Greece , the terms a nd. conditions u pon which the 
specified as s istance s hall from time to tio e be fur -
nishe d under this a gre ene:r:t ••• the Eission will provide 
such advisory assistan ce and wi ll e xerci se such fun c -
tion s a s are n e ces sai'Y an d proper to a ss ist the go vern-
ment of Greece to maJce the most effe ctive use of 
any assistance ••• l 
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Although the agre ement 0n the surface referred to the 
Nii ss i ori 1 s functions as only a dvisory and. only pertaining to 
the supervision of the program, the I'ea l s ubstan ce o f the 
agreemen t l a id the foundation f'or .Americ a n interven tion in 
Greek do mestic affairs. .America n off icials ha d little 
co nfide n ce in the ability of Gr eek governments to utilize 
constructively aid funds donated by the United Sta tes . This 
d i m view of G11 eek government l eadership was refle c te d i n 
the Porter Re por t in early 19 47 , Thi s re port st ate d , i n 
referring t o the Greek goverm.nent, that "if the present 
policies of drift a nd expe diency are co n tinued, they will 
re s ult in economic disaster to all her people. 11 2 
Intervention in the domest ic affairs of the Greelc 
peopl e was certainly not a new development, at le ast as far 
as Greeks were concer ned. The l ong trad itio n of i nterfe rence 
by grea t Euro pean powers i s a well-e s tabli shed fact . "Gree c e 
is by her na ture , n Ho·ward K. Smith Wl;ote , 11 a depende n t 
country , a nd the only issue the pO\vers are concerned. about 
3 is on whi ch of the m she shall be de pende nt. n 
1 Agreeme n t On Aid to Gre ece , June 20 , 1947, The Greek 
Aid Program , The Departwen~of Siate ,-ocfooer 1947. 
2 The Department of State Bulletin (SUi)p ],.e rne n t), .A.i d. 
to Greece and Turkey , l\!lay 4 , 1947, p . 898 . 
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Altho u gh t he abo ve obser vat i on a p ~lie d to t he Unite d St ate s 
as v:rell, .Ame rica n o f f i c ials t ook pa i n s i n the ear l y ) ar t of 
t he a i d IJrograrn to mi :OJ.i mi z e the exte n t of .Ar.:1er ican i n ter-
v e :f"2. t i on i n Gree k affa irs. Loy w· . Hender s o n , w.ho he l ped 
s hape _,\r.uel"i can pol icy i n Greece as Directo r o f the 1Jf f i ce o f 
Hear Eas t e rn a nd Afr ica n Affairs de c l ared , 11 The _4Jnerican 
go v e mnent ••• has not at a ny t i me , d ire c tly or i nd. irectly , 
4. attempted to force a:ny particul ar go ve r nul8nt on Gree ce. n -
Th i s state;: e n t seemed rather fa c etious comi::.1g a s it d id a 
fev; vJe eks after ii.Iner i ca n off icials i n Gr eece had acti vely 
i nt erve n ed. i n a ca binet c r isis i n ~-l e p tember , 19£.17 . 4 a 
Amer ica n Hi ss i on of f icia l s He re l'e lucta ~lt at f"irs t 
to exel~t pressu:ce u i:--o n Gre e]{: go v er rll:lents i n bri nginG about 
r e f orms bu t t h e laxity d is p l eyed. by Gre ek of :.t' i cials e ventual 
n ece s sita ted Bore act ive interve n tion in the po l it i cal 
affairs of Gree c e . I n u tter obj e ctivity , i t c a n be sa id 
that lune r i can i n terve n t i on d i d. no t go far enough in r::oL e 
i m;tanc e s , par ticula rly i n no t prote ~· ti ng l ou d l ;y en uu gh about 
t he r. a s:':: execut i ons pe r petrat~d uy t he Gr' ec-;L go vernme n t i n 
h 
1 947 a n d 1948 o n po li t i ca l prisoners of t he ~o li t i c a l Lef ~ . 0 
4 
The De ·· a i ·t·:ne Et of St ate Bulletiu , Vol . XVII , 
October 1~1947 , p . 7'77-. -
Lt~ .., _.. 7 --:t:._ .L . :;2.. -
5 1, 1· ~le ... "V l . . ua ..c.· ' .~-
.• ,_ .L • ..) 0 IJ ' 
Sa turG.a T' ' vc 11L15 Post , 
---·---"'- --
ff..:' r e -.,.r e o sing Gut i:J. C~ :r c.. c ce ? n , 
J '-' nu a r y 1 , 19 49 , p . 50 . 
Though ~ ome of the executions were j ns t ii'i eeL, Ame:t•i ca n 
failure t o per•sua c1e the Gr eek gover nme Yl t to u nderta :i;: e le s s 
dra s t ic measures i s nevertheless open to criticism . 
A gr eat st1.liilbling b l oclc in the :my of effe c tL1g 
re fo r ms i n Gree ce was the i nhere n t instability of Gree k 
gove r rune n t s . As refer:r•ed to i n the Introduc tion , Gre e k 
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political life c on s ist s of pers ona l f act i onE wi th v e ry lit t le 
par t y d is c i pline . .Amer ican po licy co ns t a :1t l y stres sed t h e 
e stabli sl1r1en t of national u nity i n Gr ee ce as a j!re -re ~u i si t e 
for the promotion o f re forms ; i n pra c ti ce t h is was a l mo st 
i Lposs i b l e t o ac h i eve. The ex i stence of several po l itical 
pa rties i n Greece ' s pa rl iame n t a r y system, with ea ch par t y 
or factio n ex treoely jealous of one another , hand i ca : p ed 
the erect i on of a s t able go v er :r1men t :aecessary for so lving 
the ma ny prob leu s . Thi s resul ted in a \70 eful l a ck of 
le aders hip which , by defau l t , carne to be 'l i e l de d by .fu'lle r i ca 
It must be s tr e s s e cl , ho we vel" , that t h e i ndire c t le a <le rsh i p 
wielded by AtJ. er· ic an off icials i n Greek affair' s was no t 
ac t ively s ou gh t. Ui ss i on o f f i cials c onsta ntly str ived t o 
br"i ng about the creat i on of gove rnments which coul d a ppe a l 
t o most Gr eek s as truly repre se ntative.5a Howe v er, the 
polarization of Gre ek :polit ics v.rhich occurred i n t he 
im~ediate pos t-wa r yea1s had left a probl e@ that wa s 
not to b e e a s ily solved. As a result, ~t\rne rican atte mpts 
5a 
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to fi nd moderate political groups which could provide lea de 
ship were very diff icult . It a ppeared that it would take 
years befo r e s harpe ned politica l ani mos ities could be 
dissolved in the i nterests of nat iona l vtelfare . The in-
stabil ity of Gre6k po litica l affair s ca n be attest ed by 
the f a c t that betwee n 19 45 and 1947 Greece had s eve n changes 
6 i n government . Consequently no ei'fective pro c;ram co u ld 
eve r have been achieved by the s e short - lived go verr~~ents in 
coping Yv ith the problem of J e conomic recovery . 
The first concrete example of Amerioan intervention 
in Gre ek domestic affairs came i n the ear l y fall of 1 947 , 
s hortly after the arr i val of .Al'IAG i n Athe ns . A co nse rva t i ve 
gover•nment under the pre ;,liership of Demetrios l\.Iaximos had 
falle n , due to the resignation of three Libe ral party 
mi nisters . 7 The dis pute had arisen primarily over the 
failure of the Royalist - dominated. cabinet to bring about the 
resignat ion of the controversial Mini s t er of Public Order, 
Ge nera l ~Ta :po leo n Zerv_a s, an ultr a-conse r vative wartLJe 
resistance l ea der· . 8 ze:C'v.as , as 1:iniste1· of Pub l i c (Jrder, 
ha d utili zed. ver;{ o:p pl'essive me a sures in pupp,ces-sing the 
6 Aiel to Gre ec e .And Tur key, Bul let i n Su pp lement , 
op . c it ., p . 899 . 
7 Eew York Ti mes, Augus t 24 , 194'7 , 9 :2 . 
8 
Const ':• nti+').e Po ulo s , nFiasco In Gre ece , !! J::he Na ti on , 
December 6 , 1947 . 
ac tivi t ie s of the politi ca l Left and was dee pl y distrusted 
by the mo dera te pa rties of Gr eek politica l life . It wa s 
a l so n o s e c r·et t ha t the pre s ence of zerw:as i n the Gree k 
go v e r nment was very d ista s teful to A.uer ican officials too . 
Although t h e Zervas i ncident brou ght the cris is t o a head , 
Ar.nerica n dis:::atisfact i on wi th the prosec ut i on of t he vva l' 
effor t by the kaximos go vernmen t a l so vras a con tr ibuting 
9 fa ctor . 
Altho ugh the Po pulis ts , the Roya li s t pal~ty , he l d a 
substa n tia l ma j or i ty in the Gr ee}: Chamber of De gut i e E, 
Americ an of f icials be l ieve d a mo re libe r al goverYJJ.1ent wa s 
needed i n order to co~~and the sup~ort of the bulk of the 
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Gr eek pe op le. This pre sente d. a n aviltviBl'd a noma ly for Amer ican 
off icials . The Gre ek Ch a mber of De putie s had. bee n voted 
i n t o off ice i n a general election, whi ch was re ported by 
Unitecl St ates representa t ive s on the a lli ed te am , .At,:FOC~E , 
as g eneral l y represe nting the will of the Greek people. 
Unite d S t a tes off icia l s were adarnan t, however, a nC.. i n -
s isted that a 11 broadening11 of the go vernment was essent i al 
whe n a new ca bine t wa s i n the proces s of formation. This 
Gre ek cabinet cx·isis was doubly s ignifi cant be cause it 
brought into focus the c l ash ove r the manner i n vvh ich 
9 Hevr York Ti me e , Augus t 24 , 1947. 
.Arne:rica n foreign po licy was to be i mplemented . In :pre-·war 
years American foreign :policy had be en i m:plerne YJ. ted. i n mos t 
ca s es thro ugh re gular diRp l omatic channels, usually u nder 
the supervision of career diploma t offi cers in the State 
Department . The war years had. seen the nece ssar·;y growth of 
specialized agencie s which worked i ndepende ntly of, though 
in conjunc tion with , the State Department . In the immediate 
post-war years the State Department took over most of the 
fu nctions of the specialized war a gencies. The first pre-
ce dent i n the disruption of this un ification occurred i n the 
handling of the Greek cabinet crisis of Sep tember , 1947 • 
.AliAG> hanclling the aid progra 1 , v1as under the supervision of 
the State De partment but t h e man selected as .PJviAG ' s chief was 
a po litician , not a career diplomat . 
Dwight B. Gris-vvo l d , a fo rm el' governOl' of _Jebraska, 
wa s given the authority under the Assistance to Greece Act 
to wi thholcl funds duri ::1g the impleme ntation if he saw fit to 
do Eo . Gris wo ld \Vas a hard- worki ng sin cere man who , in 
pe:rforai ng his job of supervising the a i d program , tended 
to be blunt, with litt le 1~ e ga rd for (Liplo;·J.a t ic r~ice ties. 
On the othar hand , the .Aoerica.n Amba ssaclor to Greece, Linea 
HacVeigh, was a career diplomat vvho performed his dut ies 
according to the fixed, more conserva tive methods of 
diplomacy . As the Truman Doctrine \vas a n ew dq)arture for 
9 
.Ameriean forei gn policy, iD.ore pub l icity and attent i on v1ere 
de voted t o the separate mission , .AJlAG , tha n was a ccorded the 
.Amer' ican Embas sy ' s functions. 
MacVeigh.in carrying out the Afuninistration ' s will 
for a 11 broadened 11 Greek government by including mo re Gree k 
l iberal party mer:iber•s in the cabinet conferred with 
Constan tine Tsaldar is, le ader of the ~onserva tive Royalist 
Party . The arl~angenent appeared to be that Tsa l daris 
would obtain the preniersh ip but would inclucie more Liberals 
i n the government . But as Ts8 l daris began the process of' 
forming a cabine t, .AMAG Chief Griswold bluntly announced 
that a goverrJIDent under 11salC..aris would be 11 inacLmissable . n l 
This immedi ate l y halted_ Tsaldaris in his atter:apts to f orm a 
government and produced resounding repercussions i n Greek 
politics . 
Previous to his refusal to consider a Tsaldaris 
gove rnment, Grisv-ro l d re porte d l y had dissuaded t he l eBde:c of 
national Liberal Party, Sty l anios Gonatas , from acce pting 
a cabinet post under a Tsaldaris pre m.iership. 11 Gonatas 
earlier had agreed to acce pt the cab i ne t post but withdrew 
his promise after his talk with Griswold . 
10 Poulos , o p • cit • 
ll IJew York Times, August 27, 1947 . 
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The use of the adjective, ninadmissable, n by Grisvvolcl 
pre ci pi ta ted. a r1 ild flur17 of ezci tement 1 and. .ili'Tibassador 
1-:iacVe i gh was quick to announce that Gris'1ivo lc1 meant 11 inad-
visableu rather than 11 inadmissable . n 12 This bit o f 
po le JJ.l ics did not misle ad anyone. HacVeigh, represen ting 
e sta blishe d. methods of diplomacy, and Griswo l d , Vv'i th his 
dir·ect apJ) ro ach to the p ro blem of Gre ek economic recovery , 
onl;y reveale d the co ntradiction between old-line di p lomacy 
and the new style mission concerned with a s pecific task . 
In this instance, t he new style mission gained the u pper 
hand . In an analys is of the dis pute, one writer observed, 
When diplomacy is ba Eed o n dollars, the mission 
with the funds maintains the s trate g ic rela t i onship, 
An ambas s ador may be acc 1·edi ted with a l l the so lemn 
doct~nents and privileges that are traditional in 
i n terna tional relations, but if another Arne:cica n in 
the same country has the checkbook and the authority 
to recom.mend supplies, the ambassador become s by 
comparison a minor figure ••• millions ol dollars 
speak l ouder than conve nt io nal words. 3 
The pre aie rship of the Gr e el;: government went to the 
87 year old head of the Liberal party, Themistocles 
Sophoulis, a moderate libera l. The leader of the majority 
Royalist party, Tsa l daris , still reta ined the pos t s of 
Deputy Pre mier and Foreign kiinister and co ntinued to J.~ emain 
12 Hev~ Yol~k Times , August 28, 1947 
13 James L. 1\ilcCamy, The Adrni n istration of .American 
Foreign Affairs , (Hew York : Alf:r· e cl 1~ Knopf, 19"50} p . 27t::: . 
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a strong fi gure in Gre ek po litic s . However, the cha nge in 
gover l'l..ment r e 1)re se n t e d a defin ite tr• iur.l :;Jh for 1\m.erican 
policy i n Gr ee ce . So phoulis s ymbo li zed political mod e r ate -
ness a n d was ke enl y a ware of t he t 1·eme ndous pr oblens f a c i ng 
t h e G-reek p eop le. l:iore importa nt st il l , the a ge d. premier 
profess e d. a willingne s s t o cooperate with Eission o ff i cia ~ 
f or bringing about es ~ e ntial soc i a l r eforms ne cessary f o r an 
e ff ec ·t ive i mp le rJentat i on of .~:\De rican Aid. 
AJ.o.,:AG c h ief Gr isvvo ld's v ictor y , a s manifested by the 
se l ec t ion of Sophouli s as premier, d eu onstrated the new , 
posi tive approa ch of Arnerican fore i gn po licy . Too ofte n in 
the pas t Ame r ican d i p l oma tic represe n t at ive s ha o. bec ome 
" ca ptive s " of ruli ng c l asses i n relatively backward countri es 
s u cp. a s Gl~ee ce. 13 a Vi i thout ()Oing av.rar e of it, these ~1\1.1.l e rica 
diplo at s came t o re ga rd soc i a l c onditions in thes e c ou n-
tr ies i n n uch t he same l i ght a s cUd the go verni ng c la s s es . 
The se uppe r strats, b;y v i rtue of t heir cu l tured ba ckgrounds , 
we r e ab le to ming le fre e l y vv ith Ame ric ans a n d thus pr ov i d e 
a more plea sa n t ass ociation . Cer t a i n l y it became easy for an 
.A.1ne rican <l i Dl oHa t to. ta :...e t he same viev-vpo i n t of the gover'ni ng 
cla ss i f h is service in that country vvas lizn i ted to c ontacts 
with repres ent at ives of t ha t c l ass . This c la ss vvas on l y t o o 
determi ne d to perpetuate its own privilege d st8 tus with 
( 
13a J. Rivestlhi l ds , Ju.nerican Fo reign service 
( N~w Yo r k ; Hen1y Hdlt and. Co., 1948 ) pp . 66- 69 . 
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total disregard for the welfare of the poverty-stricken 
masses in the country. Although the aims of this class may 
have -be en at variance vd th the objectives of .American fore i 
policy in a part i cular country, any effective i mplementation 
of American policy would. be obviously handicapped under the 
above conditions . The new co ncept of using s pec ialized. 
Et:i ss i ons , like ECA and .AlviAG, cha nged. all that to some d.egree. 
The se Missions we re concerned. mainly with performing s peci-
fic t asks in an a llotted perio d of time. The ap proach was 
detached and. impartial . There was lit t l e chan ce the n that 
these Mi ss io n members would too become "cap tives" of the 
ruling c la s ~ es as may have be en the case 'Ni th permane nt 
American r eprese ntativ es in t he country . 
Ho v1ever, there v1ere inherent defi ciencies t oo in ih e 
s pecia lized. nature of the Mi ss ions . In Greece the s e defi -
cie ncies ·were most apparent in the attitude of the mili ta1,y 
mission of Jili~G . These Army perso1n1e l plain l y regarded as 
their primary task the complete defeat of the rebel forces , 
a des irable aim everyone agreed. . Ye t .American officials in 
Greece constantly advocated. a poli cy of amnesty for 
guerrilla ra m~ and file forces as a means of hastening the 
end of the civil war . In the midst of the se declarations 
of amne sty by the Greek governme nt, the ch ie f of' the .America 
milit ary mi ss ion publicly exhorted the Greek army to dis play 
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no mercy and ki ll every guerr·illa as a matter of policy .14 
As a result, one .Arne ric an Carre s pende n t re po rted. , 11 We have 
g ive n Ge n eral Harkos (the guerr i lla leader) and. his men n o 
c ho ice but to s ell their lives de ar l y a nd fi ght to the 
end. . !! 15 This was unfortunate as it vJa s we ll known that 
many gue r rillas were willing to cease fi ghting if. they 
co u l d. fee l reasonably sure of not forfe it i ng the ir lives by 
surre nde ring to gove1·nment forces . 
The c hoice of :J ophoulis as pr emier hacl one other 
i mportant implication . Commu nist propaganda had. ahvays 
denounce d Royalist governments a s TTfa s c ist 11 and as res pon-
sible for the civil war . So phoulis, too , criticized Loyal-
is t Gove rnme n ts for not tak i ng constru ctive steps to end 
the civil war. Corr111unists , striving to ga in crede nc e fo r 
t he ir utterances, r epe atedly inc luded So phou lis s peeches 
a gainst t he go vernme n t as part of the i r propaganda . The 
substan ce of the propaganda ofte n h i nted. that a government 
u nd.e r So phonli s woul d. even be acceptab l e to CoiTlliJ.unist s . 
Conseque n tly , the i nstal lat ion of Sophoulis as premi er 
proved. to be a wise, ta ct ical move by the United. States a nd. 
ser.·ved. a twof o l d. purpo s e. The gove rnment was broadened. to 
i nc lude other po litical par ties, the re by ga i n i ng a dditional 
14 Bigart , op . c i t ., p . 19 . 
15 Loc . cit . 
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support from the Greek ] eop le, and. j d.eprive d Communists of 
a po litical wea po n by cho osing a ,9re1:1 ier who had the 
previous taci t approva l of the polit ical Left, i nc luding 
the Cormrn.:mir:;ts . 
I n its at t empts to prod Gree k go vernments i n to under-
tak i ng a mor e construct ive approach to the problem of 
economic reco nstruction , the Uni ted States f elt obliged to 
i ntervene openl y once again i n Greek politica l affairs . This 
occurred i n the s pring of 1 950 immediate ly after ge neral 
elections had bee n. he l cl . The civi l war hacl encled a nd Amer-
ican officials in G1·e ece , i nc l uc1ing :SCA lHss i on and Emba ssy 
personnel, continually proclded the Greek go vernment to 
speed u p the recovery program . The result s of the general 
Harch elections for the Cha mbe r of· Deputies reveale d a 
definite eme rge nce to power of modera te center groups . This 
lo ng had bee n hoped for by American off icia l s . For pre~ier -
ship the United St ates advocated t he se lection of General 
Plast i ras (Sophoulis hacl di ed ) whose po liti ca l pa ·ty had 
gained 45 seats i n the now 250 sea t Chamber of De puties. 
The other tv.;o i mport an t po l itical parties of strength were 
the Populis ts (62 seats ) and the Venizelos Li berals ( 56 ; ,.~ . .. 
seats). 1 6 
1 6 Hew Yor};: Times, Apri l 2 , 1950 , IV , 8 : 2 . 
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In the process of forming a government, there 
occurred much political maneuvering behi nd the scenes. 
According to Greek constitutiona l proce dure , the Ki ng 
selects a prominent party leader in the Chamber v.rho then 
has the mandate to form a cabine t. As the United Sta te s 
was mo st conc erned over the selection of the prospective 
premie r, .Ambassador Henry F. Gra c1y called upon the King , 
upon instr uctions from the State Department , and reportedly 
warned the Ki ng aga inst bad advice he rHi ght receive from 
. ,. t . ' t 17 r1g.g. l. S grou~s . There was no doubt that the United 
States definite ly did no t want the head of the Popul i st 
party , Tsaldoris , as premier . 
On Ma rch 23 , 1950, Sophoc l es Ve nize l os , he ad of the 
Venizelist Liberals, was svvorn in as Pr i me hiinister. This 
incurred the displea ~ure of the United States as Venizelos 
ha d. pr eviously stated publicly tha t he would support 
.American-sponsored Pla st~rms for the premiership.18 An 
a dded source of irri;!Iation to the United States 'Iivas that 
Venizelos wo uld have to depend on Populi st party support as 
the other Liberal parties , including the Plastiras -headed 
coalition, announced a policy of non-support of his 
government . 19 Amer ican criticism of the Venizelist 
17 New York Times, March 16, 1950 , 6:6. 
18 New York Tl.mes , March 24 , 1950, 10: 3 . 
19 
10 
govermnent was twofold. First, Plastiras, distrusting both 
the Ve nizelist Liberals and the Royalists , might be forced 
to make a politica l alliance with the extreme left. Second 
anc1 most important, the dependence of Venizelos on Ri ghtist 
support comp licated the establishment of d i plomat ic re-
l at i ons 'oetween Greece and Yugo slavia Yvh.i ch the United 
St ates was attempting to sponser . 1'iarshall Tito of 
Yugoslavia ha d profess ed a willingness to exchange diplomats 
with Gree ce but distrusted the Populist party. 20 
The first .open dec l aration of United States dis -
pleasure came wi th the publication .of a le tter to Veni ze lo s 
from Amer ican ~~bassador Grady . There had been talk that 
new elections were needed in order to achieve a clearer 
a li grunent of poli ti cal f orces. In his letter Grady said, 
"irres ponsib l e talk of adjo~r~i~g Parliament or of new 
electio ns before the new Parliament has had an opportunity 
to rise to its respons i bili ties •••• may do grave damage to 
21 
the country's futur·e. 11 Grady went on and emphatically 
stated that tax reforms were needed ; decentrafLlzation of 
--
government was necessary ; the civi l service law Deeded cod.-
if i cat ion; and that l oca l elections needed to ta1ce p l ac e. 
20 New York 
-- --
Time~, March 25, 1950, 6 :4. 
21 Iifew York 
-- --
Ti mes, Apri l 1, 1950 ' 4 : 3 . 
He a l so criticised excescivc spe nd i ng by the Greek go vern-
lnent a __ d called for a rno r·e construc t ive fiscal pol i cy . 22 
The Gra dy le tter was by fa r the most dra s tic declar-
ation (i t hac1 the St ate DepartmeHt ' s a pJ:; rov a l) of United 
S tates d i ssatisfaction ~ith the p~ogress of s oc ial reforms 
i n Gree ce. The United States was pr epared to back up i ts 
charges with action whi ch, i t was thought , vvoulCt stir the 
Gre ek gove rrunent . A f ew days aft e r publication of the 
Gra dy l etter , the United States author i zed a "delay in a i cl.u 
u n t il a :::: ta bl e govermnent could be formed in Gr ee ce. Th i s 
crackdown came after Ve n i zelos s aid that he was not i n a 
hurry to settle the que stion of government. 23 The threa t 
of cui'tai l ment of a id by the Un ited State s pro ved to be the 
de te ·m L -d :r:.g factor . Within a few days Veni zelos sa i d that 
the Greek governrnent was willi ng to carry out further what 
1 n 24 Greek officia s considere d "un po pu l ar reiorms . n -
The te rm , "unpo pular refor·ms ," was an e l a s tic one , as 
f ar as Gree ks were concern ec1. Greek gove x• n.ment officials 
had alvmys profe s sed a cte s ire to formu l ate ba s ic refo rr.ns 
but i n practic e re gardec1 a ny suggest ion offerec1 by I.: i s s i on 
offic i a l s wi th hostil ity . This was due part l y to resent -
ment of An1erican ad vice which, ma ny Gree .1cs fe lt, v1as ove r l y 
z,..,z Ibid. , p . l : 6 • 
2~ New York Times, Apri l 4 , 1950 , 1 : 2 . 
24 New York Ti mes , April 17, 1950, 15 : 3 . 
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critical. But the main opposition came fro m the wealthy few 
who fe are d that American economic policy was t oo egalit-
arian to suit them. Paul R. Po rte1•, i.vho was mainly res-
pons i ble for the formulation of .A1ner ica n ec onomic po licy in 
Gr ee ce, charged in 194 7 that tfJGhe government uses f o:ceign 
aid as a way of per1;etuating the privileges of a sma ll ba nk-
i ng and co mmercial clique which constitutes the invisible 
pov1er in Greece. rr 25 There was little doubt that there 
existed in Gre ece a sma ll cabal , as Porter asserted, whi ch 
d is pl ayed i nterest only in maintaining its financ ial pre -
rogative s at t he expense of the nation . 26 It mus t be said, 
hcvve:.ver, that the pauper ization of Greece as a result of a 
war, an occupa tion, and a civil war didn 't leave too many 
mill i onaire s , even by Greek standa rds . But the remaining 
few, s till pos sessing veste d interests .as b:pposed to the 
general we lfare, neverthe_less ob s·tructed. the Mi ss ions 1 s 
program for economic reform in whatever ways they could. 
A signifi cant example of the selfish attitude taken 
by vested interests is in the matter of the Greek Mercha nt 
:Ma1•ine . Before the vvar, revenue from Greek shipping had 
bee n an importan t source of incor.u.e in Greece. Over three 
25 Paul R. Porter, 11 Greece Ne eds a 1;-Iiracle, rl 
Colliers, September 20, 1947, p . 106 . 
26 Loc. cit. 
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fourths of this fleet was des troyed during the ~ar. In the 
immediate pos t-war years cre dit from the United States 
J:vJ:a r·i tirJ.e Co mmissio n totaling 45 millio ns i n dolla rs largely 
ha d reco nstitut ed Gree}{ shipping . 27 Ho·wover, in oro_e r to 
e scape taxation, ma ny Greek s h ipowners managed to put their· 
ships under forei gn ownershi p . Paul R. Porter estimated 
tha t one shipping cor.apa ny paid an eight thousand dollar tax 
in 1946 out of a profit of 250 thous and d.o l l ars. 28 Up to 
1950 nothing concrete ha d_ bee n a ccompli s hed_ by Gr e el~ govern-
me nts t o correc.t this, des pite .Alv'I.AG and EGA Mis s io n pr es ~ure. 
In overhauling the tax s tructure of Greece, little 
progres s ha s be en effected. The ex i s t ence of American 
advisors i n key positions of t he Mi n istry of Finance still 
wa s i nadequate i n co r.o.pe lling the govermne nt to undert ake a 
vigorous colle ctio n of taxe s , eve n under the very i nade quate 
tax laws pre va iling . An i nd icat io n of t he lax ity prevalen t 
i s that the country of Greece has never jailed anyone for 
failure to pay ta :xes. 29 Appro xi mately eighty per cent of 
Greek r eve nue is derived om customs a nd e xcis e taxes, t he 
lat t e r falling most heavi on the poor . One of the ma ny 
27 Gre e ce--Country tud.;y , op . cit., p. 11. 
28 Porte r , o p . cit. 
29 Er nes t 0 . Hauser 
Saturd.ay Eve ni ng Pos t , Ju 
p . 106. 
nc--ood Fews From Gre e ce, '' 
29, 1950. 
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attempts to overhaul the x structure by Miss i on of ficia l s 
was to ins i st that account g records be kept by Greek 
at ·what a compa ny was d to pa y and , in most cases , 
the t axes l evied were When thi s .AMAG-insp i red. 
proposa l was announced , At ens Merchant Associations , re -
portedl y sta ged a prote Et stri ke by cl osing their shops for 
30 three days . Thi s ne gative attitude by Greek businessmen 
only complicated the Mission ' s att empts t o overhaul the 
financial structure of Greece . 
In bringi ng a bout more efficient r..'lethoc1s in pub l ic 
administration , the G i vi l Governme nt Divis i on of .Al\l.AG is a 
good exampl e of .Ameri can effo rts to inst itu t e admi nis t rative 
reform. Thi s specialized. branch of Ji.MAG has as its ob-
jectives; (l ) the i mp ro vement of go vermne nt organization 
and procedures ; (2 ) the d.ecentral.J)zation of admi n i st ra t i on ; 
(3) a reform of the c i vil se r vice ; and (4 ) t h e st i mulatio n 
f . . 1 t . . 31 o voca~lona ra l nlng . 
During the f i rst year of .AMAG ope .ration , the Gi v il 
Gove r2~ent Divi sion made a survey of f ourteen Greek min-
i s tries and made recorn.uend.a tions vvhich stre s s ed a reduc t ion 
30 Alexander Kendr i c}c , HGreece ' s Ult i mat e Solution , n 
New Re_public, March 7, 1 949 , p . 1 L1 . 
31 Hubert R. Ga llagher , nAdmini strative Reorganizatio 
i n the Greek Crises , Public Admi n i s tration Hevi ew, Vol. VII I, 
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of personne 1 as an eco nomy me a s ure . The s e re com:Henda tions 
fell on deaf ears . The thoueht of dismi s sing civil servants, 
i nefficien t a s they may be, was a nathema for GreeJc admi n -
isGra tive off icials. 
The Greek civil service , re po rted Paul R. Porter , 
coul d not be relied upo n "to ca~ry out the s i mplest functio ns 
of go vern.11en t." 3 2 The hea d of the Civil Gove:cnme nt 
Division, Hubert R . Gallagher, wrote that of the 140,000 
Gre ek civ il servants Greece needs on ly one half that nuober. 
Galla gher ruefully added that u p to 1948 there had bee n n o 
'7 3 
r e cord of any Greek resign ing frora the Civil Se rvice. 0 
Greece's civil serv ice had ex pa nded en ormous l y d.ur i ng the 
occupation, and imme diately after, when a governme n t job 
prov i d.ed. at l ea st meage1~ f ood ra t io ns as compensation . The 
pay of c ivil serva nts, howe ver, wa s pitifully low. lviany 
actual ly had other jobs to aug.:ae n t their s raall earn i ngs:. 
Greek government officials nevertheless were reluc t ant to 
undertak e a drastic civil se1·vice r eform , for fear that 
t h eir political ca:ceers i~l i ght be put in jeopardy as a 
result . The Civil Division a lso di sclose d that pensions 
compr i s ed. 25 per ce n t of the Greek governme nt's non- mili tary 
ex penditu:ces. A study re vealed that removal of some twenty 
32 
3~ 
Porter,££ · cit ., p . 106 
Gallaghel.' , op. ..... c J_ v . 
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thousand 11 dead-headsn would. e nta il a saving of 20 per ce n t 
, , 1 
o f the budge t devoted. to payme nt of pensi ~ ns.D4 Deedle ss to 
say, the po l itical courage required to eff ect these reforms 
was suspiciously lacking and through 1950 most of the l' e-
cornr.nendations of the Civil Divisio n were yet to be acted upo 
There was some pro gres s achievecl , however. The l/Lis s ion 
olJt3 ined. an a e;reeEle n t from the Greek goverrunent \Vh ich for -
bade t he adding of personnel on go vern111en t rolls. und the 
. 3 5 i ssuing of promotions ·v".ri thout Pl"lO r .AI;IAG approva l. 
The hi ghly centralized nature of the Greek govern-
ment also was a ret a rding factor in esta blishing ad.m i n is-
trative eff iciency. Provincial autho::cities vvere una ble to 
act du ring emergencies or handl e vital issues without gett i 
instructions f rom Ath ens where a ll decisions were made . 
Als o , the governo rs or prefects, in the provinces were 
usually political appo i nte e s who followed the dic t a tes o:f 
their political parties ra thel' than performing their dut ies 
in a non-part is an ma m'ler . Under i:.lis sion pres su:ce a law was 
pass ed by the Cha mber of Deput ies in the :fall of 1949, dis -
charging politically appo inted prefects and filling the 
vaca n t l)OSi tions on the strength of competitive e:zamina -
ti ons . 3 6 
------
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid . 
A further dece n tl•a (Ll. zation of author ity, in t he form of 
local elections, was another po i nt pressed by l.!Ii s sion 
anthorities, the l atest man ifestat i on of this i ns ist&nce 
geing the Grady letter. 
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Further orga nic reforns we re i nstituted. under F:Iission 
supe r·vis ion. The mos t notable was the e le ctora 1 reform 
which reduced the sea ts in the Chamber of De puties f rom 
354 to 250. This was an obvious at t emp t to cut dov'm ad.-
mi n istrat ive expe :1s es by reducing the number of sala r ies 
of deputies. 37 
Ano ther more important reason for this reduction in 
se ats was to reduce the number of political parties and 
facti ons, or so the .American Hi s::: ion hoped . :But propor-
tiona l representation voting was simultaneously adop ted with 
the s eat-reducing measure . The elec·coral r eform did re-
duce the nmnber of parties, as the 1 950 election results 
shovied , but the adopt ed P. R. system of voting, democratic 
as it is, sti ll resulted i n a multi-party system. 
Civil liberties in Greece were seve1•ely curtailed, 
if no t completely abolished , by euccessive Gree1c governr.ne nts 
opera t i ng in an atmos phere charged wi th fear and uncertainty, 
\Vh ile the fi ght ing was in progress . It is s afe to say that, 
had there been no .American Mis s i on functionine in Greece, 
37 :r::ew York Ti mes, Ja nuary 14 , 1950, 5:5. 
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a d ictato r shi p of the Right inevita bly would have b een set 
u p . As it was , mart i a l law was the rule i n most areas of 
Gr ee c e during the civil vva r. Men tion has be e n made of t he 
persecutions of the no n - Cominuni s t pol itica l Left by Royal ist 
forc e s . Mis s i on officials since r e l y repented this, but 
t h eir atti t ude ca n perha ps be sumrae d up in this way , nA 
govern;:nent which mus t de fend itself a gains t a co n sidera-ble 
par t of its own pe ople mus t a l ways fi nd it difficult to be 
as humane as out s i ders wo uld lik e it to be. n 38 The vvar rs 
t e r mi nat io n , ho vve ver, did bring t he re s torat i on of jury 
tr i a l s , 39 and the e nd of martial law before the elec t i ons 
of Ma rch, 1950. 40 
A brief summa r y of the first three ;years of .Amer ican 
i nfluenc e i n Greek i nternal affairs does not reveal an 
i mpres:,:; ive tota l of soc i a l a nd. economi c reforms effected . 
The absence of substan t i a l social progres s was unque st i ona bly 
due t o the civil war. Still , .Arne r ican i n te rvent i on in Gr ee1c 
i nternal _affairs d i d reap some d ividends for t he Gre ek 
peo ple. With n od era te f actions gove ::cni ng Gxee c e as a result 
of the 1 9 50 elect i ons social pro gress was a l most ce :r·tain to 
ga i n further momen tum. America n Hi s ~ ions , through their 
r• 8 
- .a B. K. San clwell, 11 0ur Long- Term I n tere s ts i n Gre ece 
a nd China , n Quee n r s Quarterly, Spring , 1948 , p . 80 . 
39 1:ew York Ti me s , January 17, 1950 , 4 :6. 
40 
constant pro cl d. ings and., at times , outright interv-e ntion, 
have mana ge d. to l ay the founa.a -ci ons for further social 
reforms . l'Tow that the c ivil war is over, every Gre olc 
politician aspiri ng for an impo~tant position in political 
life must plwnJfor reforms if he ever expects to get 
I 
. \ 
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Amer i can support. The seeds for a bro ader and. be tter social 
founda t ion were sovm between the years 1947 and 1950 by the 
United. States. Under the guida nce of Jfirnerican Jilissions 
in the future, the Greek people may yet enjoy fully the 
happ i ness that comes from political and s ocial justice. 
CH.A.PTErt V 
COl~CLUS I OH 
The prime objective of the United States in extending 
fina nc i a l a id to Greece has been realized--the rolling back 
of Soviet Union penetration i n the Balkans . If this was 
the only result of expending one and one half bi llions of 
dollars in Greece, it still woul d rank as a signal success 
for United States post-war foreign policy. Howeve r, other 
significant deve l opemtns, more positive i n nature, have 
emerged during t he imple mentation of the aid program to 
Greece and have serve d to qualify the originally negative 
ap proach of .Arne rican for'e ign policy in the Balkans. 
These positive developments are, (1) the determined 
attei:1p ts by .American Hission officials to as s ist the Greek 
peop le i n raising their standard of living , (2) the realiza-
tion that basic social and economic reforms necessa r• ily had 
to be instituted for achieving success in the eco nomi c 
program , and (3) the importance of supporting moderate 
elements of Greek polit ical life while rejecting extremists 
of both the po litical Ri ght and Left. 
1Iany political observors are quic1c to po i nt out, 
however, that these encouraging developments were really 
only inciden tal and were definitely subordinate to the 
1 
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military containme nt policy. That this is substa nt ially 
true, no study of .American policy in the Balkans since 1945 
will deny. But the undisputed facts remain. Social and 
economic reforms were initiated by .American Mi ssions in 
Greece a nd did become an inte gr a l part of Nnerican policy 
i n Greece. There ca n be no quarrel with containing the 
e::{pa nsion of Commun ism by milita r y means provided that 
military measures are accompanied by positive eco nomic 
assistance pro grams designed to improve the we lfare of the 
people i nvolved. 
With some exce iJ tions, the methods used by Arnerican 
Missions in Greece in admi nisterins the aid pro gram, can 
be termed. successful . The s e methods if evaluated carefully 
can prove very useful for future economic assista nce 
programs to be undertaken by t he United States in countries 
possessing similar problems as Gre e ce. 
The most importa nt conclusion to be drawn is the 
absolute necessity for inst alling eco nomi ·c mis s ions in 
recipie.nt.~,nations of American aid. The clo se supervision of 
the disbursement of f unds is es sential for achieving the 
maximum be nefits of P~erican aid funds, particularly in 
relatively backwax'd countries . rro o often the government 
of a bac.k\lvard. country and the ruling class are the same . 
Proper utilization of these funds, i.e., for the benefit 
l 
of the people in the cow1try , i s d. iff icul t to achieve if the 
distribut i on is hancUed. by a c lass which ba s i ca lly i s op-
posed to the i n tere s ts of the greater par t of the po pulation. 
Another important method. , though of a ne gat ive nature , 
was t he threat of v1i thholding a id funds if a more construc-
tive e conomic policy wa s no t pu t into effect by the Gree k 
gover•:mne nt. Th is threat was used- co·nsd.stttJntly a nd , in the 
fina l ana l ys ie : provec1 to be the only means fo r stirring 
Greelc gover:nme n ts i n to act i on . But as a method. to be use d 
i n future aid pro grams , caution must be stres s e d i n using 
this weapon with discrimination. If no real attempt is 
made to ga i n insi ght i n to a na tion 's pro blems and regard 
them from t h e viewpoint of the recip ient-na t ion's, the 
United. States woul d be ope n to- charges of i mperialism. It 
cannot be stressed too oft en t hat each nation has pecul iar 
prob l ems of its own , which Ee ed s tudy a nd. u nders ta nd i ng . 
The thr eat of V•ii thho l di ng aid funds shoul d be used onl y as 
a last re sort i n compelli ng J::elue·li ant g ove rYJ.Jne nts t o do 
the bidd i ng of the United States . Recipient-nations must 
progress within the frame-worlc of social and cultural 
patterns suitable to them. I n Gree ce, f or example, Ame rica 
were critica l at first of the afternoon sies tas o r naps 
tak e n by Greeks of all wa l k s of life. The _!Une rican con ten-
tion was that Gre eks should le ngt h en their work day s in 
1 
co ntributi ng to the na t ion's reco nstruction pro gr am . But 
criticism s o on s topped whe n it was realized that afternoon 
na ps are a n i n te gral part of Gre ek life and have been for 
cen t u::c ie s . If conformity to stric tly America n way s of do i ng 
t h i ngs be coses a prerequis i te fo::c ex te ndi ng a id to fo re i gn 
nati ons , the i nevitable a l2imosities create d by such a ctions 
s uxe l y would hinder any as s istance p r ograms a n d wi th h o s t -
i li ty to the United State s develo p ing as a re sult . 
The ex iste n ce of s kille d .America n spec ialists who 
pe rfo r med their t a s ks in a dvisi ng the Gree k peo ple down at 
the l eve l of t he Gree k fa ::cmer and i ndustrial worker is of 
i mmea s urable i mpo1•tanc e . More tha n any other wa y , these 
i ndustrial a nd agr i cultural exp e r t s co nvinced Gree k peo ple 
i n CO :!.J.tact vvi th them of the determi nation of the United. 
State s to pr omote a better life f or t hem. Th e value of 
t h e s e perso nnel was cor11mente d on by Dorothy Thomp s on who 
s a i cL, 
11We are t h e most pro gre s sive influe n ce t hat ever hit 
t hese ba ckwa r d countries bec au s e we are teaching t he m 
lcnow- how and shovvi ng them how to make a nd do things 
and lifting thernse l ves with t heir own nowe J:' in so far 
as. t hey can • " 1 -
Althou gh a subs tantial number of the s e s pecia li s t s ope r a t ed. 
i n Greece , p rio lo ity should be g iven to s e nd ing even mo r'e 
1 Dorothy Thompso n , 11 Gre e c e Today , A l1Iira c l e o f 
Su::cviva l, 11 Vita l Spe e ches of the Day, Janua1•y 15, 1950, p . 20 
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for duti e s i n t he field. ~he teaching of adva nced te chnol-
og ical techn i ques t o a s emi- ba ckward po ] u l at i on is a short -
cut to i ncreasing productio n so necessary f or a better 
st andard of living . Al ong with redu.c i ng military personnel, 
now tha t hostilities have ende d. i n G-reece , a cor re s ponding 
i ncrease i n civilian technici ans sho uld. be effe cted . 
As has b8en shown , i nterve n t ion i n the dome st ic 
ai'fairs of Greece v..-as very nec e ssary by America E of f icials 
i n Greece \Vhe n the Greek gover·nment dra gged its f eet . But 
as i n t he thr ea t of u i thho l ding a id funds , t act Ilmst be used , 
if onl y as a ma t t er of courtesy . .Ame r ica n officials un -
fOI' tunately at times negl~ ct e d to be d iscreet about their 
c r iti c isms -thereby i n juri ng nationa l pl' i d. e an d al iena t i ng 
im~o rtant indivi duals . An examJ le of th is o cc urred i n the 
pre v i ously me nt i oned Grady le tter . The conte n ts of the 
l etter. were des i gLe d to s pul' the G-r oek go ve rm:..e11t i n to 
effective actio n but the na nne r i n which it was presented 
was poorl y clone . Grady pub li shec1 the letter before the 
Greek premier , Ve n ize los, had a chanc e to ansner the charges 
cont e; i ned i n the le t ter . G-re ek l) t.lbl ic o pi n i on wa s arou sed 
by thi s exam~ le of out right i n te rferenc e by t h e United 
St a tes anct much re s entment a t Amer·ica n methods 1if8S felt . 
Th e i n trac tib ili ty of E=: ome Gree1: goverr ... me nts ofte __ 
neces r: i t c ted stern measures by ..'l!ner i ca n 111:i ss i on off icials 
but i ndiscreet me thods such as the above i nc i dent only 
served to do more harm tha n good . I n i mple me n t i ng a i d 
pr oeraos the s pirit of coo pere tion bet iove en re pre se nt atives 
of both countr ies should not be lost sight of, even by 
.&11ericans . 
ll 
Although the United States wa s a firm supporter of 
United Nations actions i n Greece i n restoring internal 
tra nquility , not enough coo pera tion was d ispla~red by the 
United States in allowing UN speci a li zed agencies to 
fun ction more exte nsively i n Gre ece . As has be en d iscusse d , 
reluctance by the United St ates was due to the mere advisory 
:poivers he l d by the .Economic and Social Counc il of the UE . 
But i n the actua l i mpleme nt a tio n of diffe rent as ~ects of 
the eco nomic pro gram, more t echnica l experts of ZCOSOS 
could_ have shared advisory functi ons with .Ameri can experts. 
This vvou l d have serv ed t o eras e the sti gma of unilatera l i ty 
of economic as s ista nc e to Greece . It could have sel'Ved also 
as a means of laJing the foundation for eventual super-
vision by the UN oi' the Gr eek economic prograB as the FAO 
Re port had suegested , thereby relieving the Ame rica n t ax-
payer of some of the burde n . 
Th e g:rea test l;ro blem in Gree ce v1hi ch enw nds a 
solut i on is overpopu l at i on . .Ar.o.eri can officials well real-
i zed t hat this is the gr eatest obstacle i n the :path to 
so cial pro gres s . Gree ce' s e conowic r e so urc e s cue i n -
suff i c i ent t o provide for an i ncre as i ng b i r th rat e , as ha s 
been the cas e i n Gre ece during the pas t t e n y ears de s pite 
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a h a r s h o ccupat i on an d civil war . Hi stor y ha s prov en t hat 
i ndus t 1·i a l i za tion of a nati on proctuces a n a u tomat i c brake 
on i n crea s e s i n po pula t i on . But t h is us ua lly occur r s a f t er 
s evera l deca de s . I n Greece t he objective is to bring abou t 
i ncLustri a l iza tion of t he country at the ea r lie s t poss ib l e 
t i me by t ak i ng sho 1,tcu ts throu gh natio na l plann i ng . The r e -
f ore, it l og i ca l l y fo l l ows t hat pla nne d. bi r·th cont r o l and 
e ni gra t i on , s ugges t e d. i n the ILO Re port, s hould be an 
i ntegral part of t h e p l ans for the i mpr ove men t of Gre e ce' s 
s o c ial and e co nomic life . Little me nti on ha s be e n nade of 
this by :r.Ii s s i on of f i c i a l s t o Gre ek govermuent s . Di ssemi na -
tio n of knowled ge to Gre eks a bout birth contro l me thods 
could be d i scre e tly s ugge s te d by Mi ss i on of f ici a ls with t he 
Gr e ek Mi n i s t ry o f Hy g ie ne as s umi n g r es pons ibility :fo r the 
p r og ram. 
Planne d emi gr a t i on i n conj unct i on vv ith a b i r th 
contr o l p r ogram could. pro v e another progr·e ss ive me a ~;ure . The 
Unite d S t a te s could t ak e the le a d i n t h is matter by revis i n g 
exist i nt; I mi'Il i gra t i on l aws wh ich in re E1li t y d is crimina te 
agD i ns t s ou thern Europe a ns . A s l i ght l 'ev ision , such a s 
allowi n g sou t hern Europe ans t o utili ze t he unfille d quotas 
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of northern Europe ans, WO Llld re lieve greatly the population 
pres sure in Greece. As a fu rther mea s ure , emigration to 
s :par•se l y- :po IJUlB ted are as , such as British Kenya i n .Af'rica , 
for example, could be encouraged a nd fa c ilitated t h r ough 
i n telligent pla nning by both the Gl~ eek gove1'm1ent a nd the 
Americ an Mi s ;:: ion . 
This study s pecifically ha s de a lt wi th an economic 
pro gr am initi8ted and financed by the United States govern-
ment but l ittle has -been done- to encou.ra ge the inve s tment 
of inte rnational private capit a l in Greece since the ter-
mination of the fighting . The element of risk which 
fri ghte ns pr ivate ca pita l from investing in Greece ca n be ove ~ ­
come by all owing the Am.erican His s ion to gual'antee i nve s t -
ments for t en years after the i n itial inve stu.1ent . In return 
f or thi s, :private capital then would be obliged to r e-invest 
a ce r·t a in percenta ge of profits , if any , i n to the Gre eJc 
econoElY ins te a d. of allowi ng a ll of the profits to be draYn1 
out of Gree ce as wa s the ca s e i n the past . Th i s coul d serw 
t o i nduce pl' i vate Gree1c ca pita l to inve s t in t heir ovm 
country , a development that wa s not i ceably lack i ng . A fur -
t her i nduc~m ent would be to gr ant t ax- free privilege s to 
newly-invested ca pi t al by the Gree};: government fo r the f i r'st 
few years . But for ma ny years ahea d , howe ver, the great 
perce nt age of c~ pi ta l i nve s t men t in Gre e ce unq_uestiona bl:y 
will have to be p rovided by the United ~:Hates go ve1·11ffient 
in outrig)lt gran ts a s i n the past . 
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Th e expe rience gained by the United. States i n admin-
istering an economic a ss ista n ce pro gram should J rove most 
va.luab l e for future undertaldngs i n countries where co ndi -
tions para llel those of Greece. ~ut particular methods used 
i n Gr eece, s uccessful as t hey wereJ may not prove as success -
ful el s ewhe re . A certain fle x ibility needs to be mainta i ned. 
Some methods triecl. in Greece un CJ.ue stionably will re quire 
moc1ification to conform "With existing peculial~ i t ies of i n-
d ividual countries. But .regal'cl less of' me thods to be u s ed. 
the bas ic formula remains the same. Extend military aid to 
\ve a k end. countries iNhere an armed minority threatens to seize 
po·wer but on ly uncter the conditi ons that go vernme nts re-
ceiving .American Aid. undertake ce :r• t ain s t eps to impr ove poor 
ec onomic conditions . I n too many countries the ex iste nce 
of ConmlUn ist-le d. minor itie s mos t ofte ll reflects bad soc i a l 
and eco noru ic conditions . The pro gressive e liminat ion of 
the s e conditions would co1·respondi ngly reduce the r anks of 
the insurgents, this fact having been Pl'o ve n i n evei'Y country 
which ha s achieved p ro gl'ess in correcting its s ocia l a nd. 
economic ills. 
The .Arrle l"ican a i d pro graw to Gre e ce since 19'±7 could. 
be ca lle d. e galitarian in nature, though obviously no t i n tende 
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to lJe so . Through the p l a nn i ng of Greece ' s economic life 
a rec1istribution of the nation ' s na tio na l i ncom e has re -
s u ltecL An obvious objective of Ar2erica-1 polic~ in Greece 
ha s been to make certain each i nd ividua l Greek receives a 
f a ir shar e of Gr·ee c e 's national pr oduct, sorllething which 
never occurred in the past . A great and far-reachi ng re -
volution ha s tal:en hold in Greece and appears likely to 
c o nti nue. This revolution is social in nature a nd is the 
concern of everyo ne i n the western world . As the people of 
Gree ce progress to a better life for t h emselves and their 
children , t he mo st co nvinci ng proof of the creative vitality 
of the western world is once again in evidence. 
While it is true that this so cial revolution is i n 
its iYJ..i'ancy in Greece neverth elec:s under American tutelag e 
there is onl y one direction in Greece now--for·VJa rd . As e a ch 
ste 9 is ta~:e :i:l bri nging with it cor!mensurate i uprove;::Jents, 
the threat of totalitar· ianism in Greece recedes. 
As a testing ground for Unitec1 States post - war foreign 
policy, Greece ha s contributed much to the western world. 
The valuable lessons learned in Greece, if a pplied judic -
i ous l y in s imilar situations i n the future, can very v1ell re 
d.ecisive i n svvi nging the -bala nce in favor of the west i:n t.he 
backward areas of the world . 
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THESIS A..BS TF.ACS:: 
The terrible destruc t ion resulting fr om World ITar II 
presented western civilization with its most serious chal- · 
le nge in history . Wretched social co nditions amo ng the 
people8 of Europe a nd other parts of t he world left them 
highly susce ptible to Comrnunist pl'Cpaganda and infiltration . 
The s::t'neng:th of Gommun is:rh in the west continued to increase, 
thereby weakening the cletermination of western nations to 
resist the tluoeat to their institutions. 
The grasping of leadership of the western world by 
the United States , was the decisive turning point in t he 
post-war period . By throwing its tremendo us wei ght in the 
form of financ i al aid on the -scale, the tide bega n to turn 
a gai nst Soviet imperialism. The Truman Doctrine wa s the 
first man ifestation of this , and its lo gical exteneion , the 
European Recover;y Pro gJ.'am , further emphasized the dete rmin-
ation of the Unite d Sta t es to uphold western civilization . 
In exte no.ing eco nor1ic assistance, the Unit ed Sta Les 
has instigated a socia l revolution, particularly in semi-
backward countries such as Greece. This revolution , it 
needs to be stres s ed , ha s come fr om the wes t and not from 
Eastern Euro pe, as ha s been pr ophesied ever since the 
seizure of powe r i;~,a Russia by the Bolehevik s in 1917. This 
·western-inspired social revolution has as its vanguard, not 
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a \Ve ll-disciplined po li tica 1 elite as ·were the Bolsheviks , 
but a corps of technical experts. The avowed. ob jectives of 
this nevi revolutiona ry force are no t t o destroy and t h en re -
crea t e upon the ashes of the old., but to se le ct wha t is 
sound and of proven value in a nat i on ' s economic and politi -
cal structure a nd proceed to build upon the se . This selec-
tive pro cess is of gre at signi f icance . Tried and. t ested 
methods which have demons tra ted their wor thine s s and dura-
bility a r e ·t;hen reinforced . The succes sful implementa t ion 
of socially pro gr essive measures , if to prove effect ive and 
l asting , relies heavily on the experiences of the pa s t . 
Ene r gies therefore are no t devo t ed to eff ecting a h irac le 
but to i mproving those cultural and social patterns which 
recipie nt nations ~ish to retain . In Gre e ce, experts 
a t tached to .Mnerica n Missions have gone to the people and 
given technical advi ce . There v1as no at tempt to dec i de 
a :cbitrar ily what livelihood the average Greek V/88 to pursue . 
Uni ted States policy was to let Greeks de c i de for themse lve s . 
In the proposed i ndustrialization of Greece , the inte nt is 
to expand i ndus tri a l f ac ilities thereby creating nev.r employ-
men t opportunities . ·nork in a factory under pro gress ively 
i mprov i ng social conditio ns mi ght then appeal to the f a1·mer , 
rather than ekeing a meaeer existe nce from the soil • . In this 
way , the hoped for transfe r of more i'al'mers to indus try ca n 
be achieved. without using arbitrary measures so chara c te.risti 
of totalitarian societies. The all-impo rtant fr eeuom or 
choice then becomes an i n t egral part or natio nal eco nomic 
planning . 
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The mo st st:r:•i lcing characteristic o1· this revolution, 
designed to improve social and eco nonic life, is the deter -
mi natio n "t o effect pro gress within the framework of western 
libel~al tradition. The drastic overhauling a nd reorganiza-
tion of Gre e ce's economy is being accomplished by using 
democra tic me thods such as discussions and conferences be-
twe en Junerican Mission officials and the Greek government . 
Of course it is true that Mission officials often became 
exasperated at the seeming unco ncern dis played by Greek poli-
tical leade r s for the welfare of the Greek peo ple. Outright 
intervention in Greece's domest ic affairs by the United 
States was an i nevitab l e res ult of this. Despite these out-
bursts of irritat i on , lviission officials have strived doege d ly 
to persuade Greek governments of the necessity for reforms 
and of "following a policy be nef i c ial to the Greek people. 
The value of treating GreeJ{S a s equals and not as subordinate 
as s ists in cultivating feeli ngs of respo ns ibility on the 
part of Greelr. leaders for the difficult t a sks ahead. 
I n Greece, the principle of self help has been an 
i n te gral part of United States eco nomic policy. In a demo -
cratic society each, if physica lly and menta lly able, real-
izes that he must contribute to the ge neral welfare while 
, 
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still retaining his identity as an i nd ividual. He neither 
accepts nor wants unneces s ary s upport from his society. By 
en coura gi ng the Greek people to help t hems elves , the founda -
tion for a po litically res ponsible electorate is being 
i mplanted . 
The concern with whi ch the United Nations ha s re garded 
the i n ternal situation in Greece was very i rnporta ::1t. The 
banding to gether of free nat i ons to offer mora l support to 
the Gree1r government i n its struggle against the e:z:ternally-
a i ded guerril las was a hopeful deve lopment . It as sured the 
Greek people of the righteousne ss of their opposition to 
Soviet Union penetrat i on . The contribution of the Economic 
and Social Council in the form of services and studies with 
recou'liD.endations for improvement of social conditions further 
strengthens the Greek peop l e ' s determination to take longer 
steps on the road of socia l progress. 
The eventual ac hieve ment of e cono 1~1 ic security, brin g-
ing vii th it social and political stability , appears lilcely if 
int elligent national plam1i ng co ntinues to be carried out 
in a democratic manner . By keeping both objectives, social 
justice and political freedom, constantly in mind.J the co nt en-
tion that the west is truly the most revolutionary force of 
a ll time will be justified. 
